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The Problem
Conceptual Considerations
In essence the concept of "brain drain" or "talent drain" is meant to cap­
ture the notion of the traasfer of "highly skilled labour" and expertise from 
the countries to which such expertise is native, to other countries. As Hel­
mut Faulwetter has indicated, while a universally accepted formulation of 
the phrase "highly skilled labour" does not exist, there is some measure of 
agreement with regards to the general category of persons, covered under 
the rubric. He suggests that, "highly skilled labour" covers;
those having completed college education and possessing a 
university degree, as well as those who have acquired signi­
ficant occupational experience and knowledge through prac­
tical work.
A distinction should be made between voluntary and involuntary migra­
tion. The former category of migrants consist of those who through their 
own volition decide for various reasons to seek employment outside their 
native countries. It is this group which is centrally the object of this study. 
Involuntary migrants are those elements who due to pressures of a social, 
political, or military kind, are forced to traasfer their occupational and liv­
ing habitat to another country. Such exiles are generally refugees, and fall 
outside the scope of this study. Voluntary migrants are often described as 
"economic refugees".
It is important to note that significantly the movement or transfer of "high­
ly skilled labour" operates from poorer to richer and developmentally bet­
ter endowed countries. In effect, the drift of intellect and highly skilled 
labour represents "brain gain" for the more developed countries. The costs 
of training the highly skilled labour is borne by the poorer country but the
1
benefits of the education and training of such highly skilled migrants are 
reaped by the more developed target country. Thus for the recipient 
country, the phenomenon of "brain drain" serves to expand its overall na­
tional wealth and more particularly, strengthen its human resource base and 
capacity.
A good part of the cream of such intellect and highly skilled labour are 
top-class elements with education acquired in the developed countries at 
considerable cost. Estimates of the UNCTAD Secretariat suggest that the 
capitalized value of skilled migration from the developing countries to the 
three developed countries, Canada, the U.S.A. and the U.K. for the 12 year 
period of 1961-1972 amounted to about 42 billion U.S. dollars or an aver­
age of 3.5 billion U.S. dollars per year.2 Out of an estimated total of 300,000 
emigrants from developing countries to the industrialized countries of the 
western world, about 230,000 went to the United States, the United King- 
dom, and Canada.' UNCTAD estimates reveal that the gain for the de­
veloped countries which benefit from brain drain from the poor countries 
runs into hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars 4 The number of highly 
skilled persons emigratin| to the U.S. between 1974 and 1979 has been es­
timated at about 190,000. A U.S. government study of 1974 indicated that 
between 20 to 50 percent of the annual increase in engineers came from de­
veloping countries. 50 percent of the annual increase in medical doctors 
are from the developing countries.6
Most of the phenomenon of brain drain occurs within the ambit globally 
of the capitalist world. It has been argued that in the language of political 
economy, it is a feature of capitalism that, specific and requisite production 
factors are created and nurtured where socio-economically maximum capi­
tal utilization is available. It is thus in this fashion that the process of the 
internationalization of capitalist relations induces an international drift of 
labour sources, from the less developed countries to the more developed 
countries within the^entire capitalist world. Faulwetter has drawn atten­
tion to the fact that contemporary bourgeois economics often conveys the 
impression that the concept of resource transfer focusses on formal or of­
ficial development assistance, transfers of a bilateral and multilateral kind,
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private investments or multilaterally financed investments, loaas either for 
development projects or adjustment of payments, and the transfer of tech­
nology. The World Bank for example registers under the "totality of net 
flows of resources" only resources which flow from developed countries to 
underdeveloped ones. In fact, transfer from the developing to the de­
veloped countries takes place in different forms. These include visible 
forms like officially recorded flows, profit transfers, debt and interest pay­
ments, and capital exportation. Invisible transfers are not recorded.
These involve the transfer of part of the surplus value from 
developing countries to industrialized market-economy 
countries. A permanent under-pricing of export com­
modities from developing countries is the result of monop­
oly conditions. The prices paid for these commodities 
represent only a part of their real value. In turn, developing 
countries are forced to pay exorbitant prices for their imports.
The flow of the value difference in most cases is such as to 
bring about a transfer of resources (value) to the economies 
of the highly developed capitalist countries, using prices as a 
means of transport. For this there is no compensation. The 
available income in the latter increases in absolute terms.
One example of such an invisible transfer is represented by 
income pricing. Another form of invisible transfer is repre­
sented by income and wealth outflows which have nothing 
to do with official trade or economic relations, but which are 
a result of international economic conditions. Two examples
9
are smuggling and the brain drain.
This structural explanation underscores the objective basis of the phe­
nomenon and reduces to a subsidiary but relevant category, volitional and 
subjectivist explanations of the phenomenon.
In an UNCTAD study of a few years ago, the arguement was made that 
the flow of highly skilled intellect is much more than a simple movement 
of people. More importantly, it is an economic manifestation.
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It is a real transfer of productive resources from poor to rich 
countries. In as much as technology is a combination of 
knowledge and capital equipment, the migration of people 
with skills is clearly a transfer of technology. Since such 
transfer takes place from the developing to the developed 
countries, or from the poor to the rich, the phenomenon has 
been termed a "reverse" transfer of technology. Further, in 
so far as knowledge and skills are acquired as the combined 
result o f investment in education, training and allied activities 
and nurture the maintenance of the persons concerned, they 
could be considered as a form of productive resource embo­
died in human beings, or human capital.10
While it is difficult to put a specific and quantifiable value on the human 
resources siphoned-off by the receiving countries, it is currently, univer­
sally accepted that the drift in highly skilled labour represents high-value 
technological and know-how transfer in the reverse direction. This point is 
clearly acknowledged in the UNCTAD study, which describes the transfer 
in the reverse direction as a fundamental contradiction built into the migra­
tion system.
The disturbing and morally unnerving fact about this contradiction is that 
at a point in time and history when such highly skilled manpower and in­
tellect is most needed in the developing countries, to assist in the combat 
against poverty, disease, educational and cultural backwardness, and 
general underdevelopment, the crucial manpower is siphoned-off to gener­
ally less needy areas of the world.11 This fact is attested to by Benson Riun-
gu in a recent article, describing the phenomenon of reserve human resource
12transfer as "an anomalous situation". Conservative estimates suggest
that, annually, the transfer of highly skilled labour from the developing to
13developed countries number between 60,000 and 70,000. Precise figures 
on the volume of such migratory movements are hard to come by, and dif­
ficult to quantify.14
Another corroborative picture of the dimensions of brain drain is given by
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the Director of the Technology Division of the UNCTAD Secretariat indi­
cating that brain drain for underdeveloped countries involves between 20 
to 70 percent of the annual output of various categories of highly trained 
personnel.
Migration of such large numbers has made it difficult for the 
developing countries concerned to reach that critical mass of 
scientific and technological manpower which alone could en­
gineer the breakthroughs needed for accelerated economic, 
social and technological transformations. Moreover, atten­
tion has to be paid to the magnitude of investments that have 
been made and then lost through such migration.15
According to the Inter-governmental Committee for Migration (IMC), 
there are in Europe alone some 30,000 highly trained expatriate personnel
who collectively constitute a valuable human resource potential which is
• • 16 now missing.
Increasingly the UN system is directing attention to the brain drain phe­
nomenon, or as it is described since the 1972 UNCTAD conference, as 
"reverse transfer of technology".
In structure, two categories of people can be identified. Firstly, there are 
those who go out as students from poor or developing countries to the de­
veloped and industrialized world to study. On the completion of their 
studies, many stay on and take on jobs in their host countries. Apart from 
the material benefits of employment in the host country and the quality of 
life, many become "acculturated" and educated away from their roots 
through the socialization process they undergo in the host country, Cesar 
Moyano recalls:
A sentence taken from an interview with someone queueing 
for a visa at a foreign embassy gives eloquent support to the 
view of the disparity between educational system and em­
ployment opportunities as one of the determining factors of
5
emigration: "We have been educated to live in another
" , n 17 country.
For various reasons, the longer they stay outside, the more difficult it 
becomes for them to return to their native countries. Secondly, there are 
others who are trained professionals migrating from underdeveloped to de­
veloped countries.
A number and range of factors have been identified as the principal pull 
factors which induce and encourage professionals and highly trained per­
sonnel to migrate from their native countries. Principal among these ap­
pear to be better salaries, benefits, attractive wage structures and a quality 
of life relatively free from consumer shortages. These economic factors 
constitute possibly the most crucial considerata. It is a fundamental law of 
capitalism that capital attracts labour, skilled or unskilled, but the need for 
skilled or unskilled labour depends on the extent of capitalist development, 
the degree of capital concentration and the differentiation of production. 
Most studies agree that economic considerations represent the essence of 
the factors which promote skilled migration. As Krugman and Bhagwati 
have observed;
The evidence that migration is influenced by economic in­
centives is so uniform and secure that; if anyone should argue 
for any particular case that economic gain has no effect, one 
should be sceptical; particularly where migrants do in fact 
gain economically from their move. Furthermore, such evi­
dence as there is suggests responsiveness to the possibilities 
of gain from migration18
The search for material rewards constitutes the primary force motivating 
the brain drain or brain gain phenomenon. But this is built within the inter­
national capitalist structure; the enlargening and deepening globalization 
process of the world capitalist system. For some professionals, support in­
cluding libraries, laboratories, and better working conditions are of import­
ance. Social and political stability free from the uncertainties and turbulence
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of most Third World states, as is often found in the developed countries are 
of some significance. The wish and hope of providing what is considered 
by some to be desirable conditions for die education and socialization of 
their families also plays a pulling role in professional class migration.
While the push factors may be essentially the reverse side of the pull fac­
tors, attention can be drawn to those factors closely related to the conditions 
of underdevelopment in the naiive countries. Principal amongst these are 
unattractive and often socially debilitating remunerative conditions; an 
over-supply of highly-educated professionals in a narrow occupational field 
with a consequent depression of wages and salaries; discrimination, repress­
ion and sometimes terror arising out of intolerant social climates, diverging 
political opinion, race, religion, caste, ethnicity, or a combination of these 
factors.19
There are those whose migratory push drive is fuelled by the fear of what 
Goodwin and Nacht have described as "intellectual and professional 
decay". Like Gulliver, they could in their worst fears be slowly paralysed 
by a complex of existential factors prevalent in tl»e poor and underdeveloped 
countries to which they are native. These conditions nurture loss of morale, 
poor professional performance, low productivity and output. Goodwin and 
Nacht relate that;
We were told of more than two hundred young Turkish scho­
lars who returned from American graduate training "llying 
over the clouds", they thought they would reform their sys 
tem in the image they had come to know and respect. After 
two decades, they grew tired and discouraged with the
prospect of old forces of reaction building up against them
21once again and with no continued reinforcement.
Under such and similar conditions professionals and highly trained per­
sonnel with a measure of marketability become highly prone to migration.
UN Concerns
7
In pursuit of policies to arrest the adverse effects for the developing coun­
tries of the migration of highly skilled manpower to the developing world, 
UNCTAD has raised the call for what it describes as a "reverse technology 
transfer taxation scheme", whereby immigrants and if possible their host or 
target countries should be taxed to compensate the source countries for their
9 9
losses through migration. Some developing countries in order to stem the 
tide of out-migration are adopting restrictive measures through passport 
regulations, foreign exchange controls, and exit permit requirements. For 
example in 1971, Sri Lanka passed a Passport and Exit Permit Act to con­
trol and monitor out-migration. Exit permits require the opening of a com­
mercial bank account in Sri Lanka into which at least 10 percent of the
23earnings of migrants should be deposited, as remittance from abroad. In 
the last few years the Ghanaian authorities have created facilities for Gha­
naian expatriates to hold hard currency accounts in Ghana. Customs duty 
and tax exemptions allow Ghanaian expatriates to bring in personal effects 
free of charge if they have been out of the country for more than two years. 
The Ghana Housing Corporation has also instituted for years now, a scheme 
for home construction and part-payment for Ghanaian expatriates.
In 1958v the Indian government created a talent pool for its nationals 
abroad enrolled in the Indian Abroad section of the National Register. This 
organization assists Indians abroad to find job openings in India. Increas­
ingly in recent years, the developed industrialized countries have instituted 
laws on immigration intended to check the flow of migrants. The World 
Employment Conference of 1976, organized under the auspices of the In­
ternational Labour Organization (ILO) recommended the use of bilateral 
and multilateral agreements between the migrant-exporting and mi grant-re­
ceiving countries aimed at replacing unilateral formulae for immigration 
25control. In an address made to the 1977 ILO Conference, Prince Hassan 
of Jordan proposed an International Compensatory Facility for the benefit 
of developing countries suffering from the brain drain phenomenon. In es­
sence the proposal argued that countries which lose an important segment 
of their highly-trained manpower through brain drain should be entitled to 
financial compensation which those countries benefitting from such migra­
tory practices should be liable for compensation. Others have suggested
Che possibility of levying a supplementary lax on incomes made by develo­
ping -  country migrants in the brain gain countries. According to UNC­
TAD these possible measures arc as follows:
(a) A modest contribution by host developed countries, in the form 
either of direct assessment or of tax-sharing arrangements under an 
agreed formula, supplemented by the possibility of permitting from 
developing countries migrants to make voluntary, tax-deductible 
contributions to charitable organizations in developing countries and 
of earmarking, again on a voluntary basis, up to 10 percent ol their 
income tax payments in developed countries for developmental pur­
poses:
(b) A moderate supplementary tax levied on the income ofdevelo- 
ping-country skilled migrants in developed countries (say, at a rate 
of 5 per cent for a period of no more than 10 years) under a global 
tax system, representing the contribution of individual migrants to 
the development process of tlieir home countries.
(c) The creation of specially chartered organizations under inter­
national, regional or country auspices in conformity with a model 
organization arrangement to be prepared and continually revised in 
accordance with internationally agreed procedures: these organiza­
tions could receive and spend funds raised through measures set out 
in (a) and (b) above:
(d) Possible extension of the IMF compensatory financing facility 
to take account of "adjustment problems" associated with unwar­
ranted fluctuations in currency.2
As Schaldt rightly confirms, with the realities of divergent interests in the 
contemporary world, no comprehensive international agreement along the
above stated lines lias so far been possible. The developed countries have
27strong objections to an International Labour Compensatory Facility.
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The attention and efforts of UNCTAD in pursuit of palliatives for the brain 
drain phenomenon are at the analytical level considerable. Practical and 
hard solutions are however thin. Within the framework of UNCTAD, is­
sues impinging on the drift of highly trained manpower from the develo­
ping to the developed countries have been under consideration since the 
meeting in Santiago, Chile, 1972. From that point in time to the present the 
UNCTAD Secretariat has generated a mass of studies on the volume, struc­
ture and directions of flow of highly skilled personnel. An important pre- 
occupative strand in these transactions relate to the general policies pursued 
at the national, regional and international levels, plus the conceptual and 
methodological considerations relevant to the reverse transfer of technol­
ogy.
Two important meetings on the theme were held in 1983 and 1984 in re­
sponse to a mandate of the UN General Assembly fonnulated under Resol­
ution 37/207 of the General Assembly. This mandate invited experts and 
institutions to:
formulate policies and concrete measures with a view to miti­
gating the adverse consequences ior the developing countries 
of the revetse tiansfer of technology, including the proposal
for the establishment of an international labour compensat-
<•* 28 
ory facility.
In meetings under the auspices of UNCTAD in 1978 and 1982, an attempt 
was made to focus on conceptual and methodological matters.29 As from 
1983 to the present, efforts have been more directed toward formulating 
viable policy recommendations and concrete solutions. The principal and 
essential components of what is conceived to be an integrated programme 
of action on international skill exchanges have been delineated, and some
headway has been made with regards to the examination of technical and
30substantive dimensions of these components.'
On September 2, 1985, Yves Berthelot, the Deputy Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD pointed out that the ef forts of UNCTAD at various experts ’ meet­
10
ings on the issue should be understood in the wider context of efforts being 
made by the developing countries to advance the pace of their technologi­
cal and economic development. The crucial factor of human resources, es­
pecially skilled manpower have increasingly become one of the main 
resources for all these countries. The need to mobilize and use human re­
sources for development purposes constitutes a major concern for develo­
ping countries and the international community as a whole.31 The summary 
position of UNCTAD on the problem of brain drain was put out as: "Pre­
liminary Outline of a Set of Guidelines on the Reverse Transfer of Tech- 
nology". As one of its leading agenda Issues in the near future, UNCTAD 
has committed itself, "to consider and formulate an integrated programme 
of action on the reverse transfer of technology and recommend the mo- 
dalities for its implementation. Another UN agency which in the past has 
shown concern for the issue of the international brain drain phenomenon 
has been the United Institute for Training and Research. Its interests date 
from the 1970s.34
The South African Connection
It is noteworthy that while the main directions of the flow of brain drain 
have been in favour of the developed countries of the First World, in recent 
years there is an increasing tide of skill flow among the developing coun­
tries themselves. This trend is identifiable to two emerging phenomena. Fir­
stly, some of the developing countries in relative terms are making 
considerable advances in their human resource skill profiles. Secondly,
there are those cases where accumulating surpluses of investible resources,
35are accompanied by excess demand for skills in others. ' The phenomeno­
logy of these trends are such that to some extent complementarities have 
been created in the economies of these two sets of underdeveloped coun­
tries i.e. skill-rich, resource-poor countries and skill-poor, resource-rich
. • 36 countries.
An insight into the above is provided by Bhagavan. He has argued that in­
spite of the fact that in absolute figures, highly skilled and technologically
11
equipped people in countries like Sri Lanka, India, the Phillipines, Pakis­
tan, and Egypt are considerably large when considered as percentages of 
their overall and economically active populations, they are in Tact quite 
small. One would therefore expect a shortage or demand within these coun­
tries. But the reality of the situation is different. Indeed large numbers of 
skilled personnel emigrate from these countries to tl»e oil-rich countries of 
the Middle East. The explanation Bhagavan offers is that in these skill-en- 
dowed and skill-exporting countries, the relative sizes and the developmen­
tal growth rates of the industrial sectors are relatively small and often 
insignificant in proportion to the total population because they "have grown 
largely in step with the consumption demands of the middle and upper 
classes, who constitute 5 to 10 percent of the population". The rate of growth
has tended to level off once this demand is met, but the production and de-
37velopment of skilled personnel has more or less steadily continued.
In Latin America, the experience of oil-rich Venezuela is confirmatory of 
the trend of skill-rich resource-poor emigrants moving into skill-poor re­
source-rich countries. Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s the How into 
Venezuela was steady. This consisted largely of migrants from the Carib­
bean and Latin America. While Colombians, Dominicans and other Carib- 
beans tended to fill the lower levels, Chileans, Argentinians, Bolivians, 
Uruguayans and Peruvians occupy the higher skilled levels. The stream
started depreciating and flowing in the opposite direction in 1979 when the
38Venezuelan economy started levelling off.
On the African continent, South Africa is the most technologically ad­
vanced and developed countiy. The concentration of capital in the Repub­
lic of South Africa is second to none on the continent. Since the late 19th 
century, South Africa has attracted migrant labour from the whole region 
and further afield. Most of the labour from the Southern African region 
drawn into the Republic of South Africa is unskilled. Skilled labour has 
tended to come from Europe. However during the last decade, South Afri­
ca has been drawing skilled and highly skilled labour from within Africa 
but outside the Southern African region; specifically from Eastern and 
Western Africa. This highly skilled labour or personnel is being drawn into
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the so-called Homelands or Bantustans. From fairly small and relatively 
insignificant beginnings in the late 1970s, the size of this emigration has 
magnified. The international stigma attached to South Africa because of its 
Apartheid policies of iastitutionalized racism, throws the African brain 
drain into South Africa into a special, topical and sharp relief.
To many minds it raises issues of the "cultural boycott", the OAU position 
vis-a-vis South Africa, and sanctions. The sensitivity of the issue is under­
scored by the fact that, in a world which increasingly is morally revolted by 
the Apartheid system, and where most countries and peoples are being dis­
couraged to have social and economic intercourse with South Africa, Afri­
cans from different comers of Black Africa are streaming into South Africa. 
The poignancy of the situation is highlighted by the fact that all this is hap­
pening at a time when the resistance to the Apartheid system is increasing 
in scope. While thousands of South Africans are drifting into exile to es­
cape and resist the Apartheid system, other Africans are going in to work 
within the system, propping it up, and drawing salaries far better than can 
be obtained anywhere in sub-Saharan Africa.
Most African governments whose highly-skilled citizens work in South 
Africa are unhappy with this situation. Despite their not infrequent protes­
tations the flow into the Homelands, of skilled African personnel continues. 
Accusations and counter-accusations are not uncommon on the issue. They 
range from accusations of political and national treachery on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, migrants who argue that for various reasons life is 
better in the homelands than in their native countries. What the present study 
however reveals is that most migrants, once they are outside South Africa 
tend to hide or conceal the fact that they work in South Africa. This has op­
ened them up also to the charge of being "mercenaries and opportunists who
39would stop at nothing to have their greed satisfied .
The fact that most of these highly skilled African migrants currently work­
ing in the South African homelands arc from Ghana and Uganda is not coin­
cidental. These two countries show a skill-rich resource-poor profile. 
Furthermore, they are countries which in the last two decades have seen a 
lot of political turbulence and repression, shattered or retrogressing econ­
13
omies, social dislocations and general societal instability. This is particu­
larly true of the Ugandan case. These factors are of significance in under­
standing the great trek of talent from these countries into the South African 
homelands. Their presence however offers an arguement for the apologists 
of the Apartheid system who argue that South Africa is attractive for other 
Africans even in the face of Apartheid. Migrants from within the region do 
not attract as much attention as other African migrants from further afield. 
For one thing they ethno-linguistically lit more easily into South Africa. 
For another many are interwoven consanguinally with South Africans. This 
is particularly true of tlie Basotho, the Batswana, the Swazi, Malawians, 
Zimbabweans, Zambians and Namibians. These relations stretch back in 
time. It is the West Africans and the East Africans; who are more or less 
new migrants, who attract attention for their novelty and distance covered. 
Their ability to melt into the social landscape is not as strong as other Afri­
cans from the region who have stronger ethno-linguistic bonds in the area. 
Many tend to circulate within their own communities, reinforcing social 
cleavages which accentuate their relative foreigness to the Southern Afri­
can region. Their better-paid circumstances may also attract resentment and 
hostility especially among competing local social classes.
There are those who would argue that whatever the moral merits or deme­
rits of the situation may be, the fact that Africans from different comers of 
the continent are being thrown together would in the long run facilitate the
difficult but generally amongst Africans desirable process of African
• 4 40 unity.
NOTES
1. Helmut Faulwetter. Brain Drain and Human Rights. Ml Bulletin of the 
GDR Committee fo r  Human Rights. No.3. 1986. p. 162. It has been sug­
gested by Walter Adams that the term brain drain was launched into popu­
lar usage in recent years by a British Royal Society report of 1962, to 
describe the emigration of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the 
United Kingdom to North America. See Walter Adams. Talent that won’t
14
stay put. Population Bulletin, 25. No.3. June 1969. Jorge d’Oliveirae Sousa 
of the UNCTAD has observed with regard to its vintage that,it has been a 
known phenomenon at least in the western world since Atheneus, an ancient 
Greek chronicler recorded in about A.D. 150 "the drain of Greek brains to 
Alexandria". See Jorge d’Oliveirae SousaThe Measurement of Human Re­
source Flows. In, Trade and Development. UNCTAD Review.No.6. 
1985 .p. 109.
2. See Summary and Conclusions; The Reverse Transfer o f Technology^ 
A Survey o f its Main Features, Causes and Policy Implications. UNCTAD. 
TD/B/C.6/47. 1979.
3. Le transfert inverse des techniques UNCTAD. TD/B/AC./l 1/25. Rev.
I 1974. Quoted here from Rodolfo Bertonceiio. Background to Research 
on the Emigration of Argentines; In A.E. Lattes and E. Oteiza (ed). The 
Dynamics o f Argentine Migration (1955-1984): Democracy andthe Return 
o f Expatriates. UNRISD. Geneva. 1987. p.20.
4. The Feasibility of Measuring International Flows of Human Resources. 
UNCTAD. TD/B/C.6/82, 27/5. 1982. See Helmut Faulwetter. The Inter­
national Transfer of Resources: Flows of Income from Developing Coun­
tries. In Trade and Development. No.6. 1985. p. 104.
5. Towards an Integrated Approach to International Skill Exchange. UNC­
TAD. TD/B/AC.35/2, 29/8. 1983. See H. Faulwetter (1985) Ibid.
6. Brain Drain: A Study o f the Persistent Issue o f International Scientific 
Mobility. Congressional Research Service. U.S. Government. Washington. 
1974. See H. Faulwetter (1985) Ibid p. 105.
7. H. Faulwetter. (1986) Ibid. p. 162.
8. See, Towards Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. World 
Bank. Washington. 1984. Statistical Annex. Table 18. Also, The Develop­
ment Committee; Its FirstTen Years 1974-1984. Washington. 1984. Quoted 
here from H. Faulwetter. The International Transfer of Resources: Flows 
of Income from Developing Countries. In Trade and Development. No.6. 
1985. p.90-91.
15
9. Helmut Paul wetter. Ibid. 1985. p.90-93.
10. Towards an Integrated Approach to International Skill Exchange: Pro­
posals fo r  Policy and Action on Reverse Transfer o f Technology. UNC­
TAD. TD/B/AC.35/2. Geneva. 29 August. 1983.
11 .Ibid.
12. Benson Riungu. ICM. A Plug in the Third World Brain Drain. Devel­
opment Horizons. No.2. March 1988. p.20.
13. UNCTAD. TD/B/AC/.35/2. Op. cit.
14. See B.M.A. Balasooriya. The Brain Drain. Economic Review Colom­
bo. Sept. 1975. Case Studies in Reverse Transfer o f Technology (Brain 
Drain). Surveys o f Problems and Policies in India (TDIBIAC.4I6. Geneva. 
13 Dec. 1977). For the Phillipines (TCIBIC.6AC.4t5). Facts and figures 
are available lor also Sri Lanka, Pakistan, e.t.c. See H. Faulwetter (1986). 
Op. cit. See also M. J. Boodhoo and A. Baksh. The Impact o f  Brain Drain 
on Development: A Case Study o f Guyana. Kuala Lumpur. 1981. J.A. Sac- 
key. The Migration of High Level Personnel from Guyana. Transition.
1978. Vol. 1. No.I.
15. Meeting of Governmental Experts on Reverse Traasfer of Technol­
ogy; Statement made by S.J. Patel, Director, Technology Division, UNC- 
TAD/CA/2190. Sept. 1983. Quoted here from H. Faulwetter (1986) Op. 
cit.
16. Benson Riungu. Op. cit. The ICM was created in 1974 in Latin Ameri­
ca where the phenomenon of brain drain was then ravaging the fabric of the 
development concerns of the Latin American countries. It has since spread 
its activities to the wider underdeveloped world. With the programme "Re­
turn of Talent", which has as its goal the reversing of the brain drain in many 
countries. Since its inception some 13 years ago, the ICM has demonstrated 
some results. Witli U.S. government and EEC aid, by 1981 it had succeeded 
in getting about 3000 Latin Americans back into Latin America. In 1981 
the organization was invited to Africa, and has since started a pilot scheme 
covering Kenya, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. By 1988 the ICM had received
16
1082 applicatioas from potential returnees lor placement in Africa. See 
Benson Riungu. Op. cit. See also Tokten : A Ten-Year Brain Gain. UNDP. 
New York. 1988.
17. Cesar Moyano. The Emigration of Argentines through tl>e Eyes of the 
Argentine Press. In A.E. Lattes and E. Oteiza. (ed) The Dynamics o f Ar­
gentine Migration (1955-1984). Democracy and the Return o f Expatriates. 
UNRISD, 1987. P. 117.
18. Paul Krugman and Jagdish Bhagwati, The Decision to Migrate: A Sur­
vey. In J. Bhagwati (ed). The Brain Drain and Taxation, 11. Theory and 
Empirical Analysis. Amsterdam. 1976. p.40. See also Cesar Moyano, The 
Emigration of Argentines through the Eyes of the Argentine Press. In A.E. 
Lattes and E. Oteiza. The Dynamics o f Argentine Migration. (1955-1985) 
Op cit. UNRISD. 1987. P. 116.
19. Markus Schladt. Brain Drain Unaddressed. Development Forum. UN 
Publication. Vo. 15. No.l. Jan-Feb 1987. See also M. Rochester. Prepar­
ing Libraries for the 21st. Century. International Federation o f Lihraiy As­
sociations Journal. Vol. 14. No.l. 1988. p.37.
20. Crauford D. Goodwin and Michael Nacht. Decline and Renewal. 
Causes and Cures o f Decay Among Foreign-Trained Intellectuals and Pro­
fessionals in the Third World. New York. 1986.
21. C.D. Goodwin and M. Nacht. Ibid. p. 14.
22. Some UNCTAD documents on reverse transfer of technology:
TD/239. Technology: Development Aspects of the Reverse Transfer of 
Technology: Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat (to be reproduced in Pro­
ceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Fifth Session, Vol. Ill, Basic Documentation).
TD/B/AC.l 1/25/Rev. 1. The Reverse Transfer of Technology Economic 
Effects of the Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries 
(United Nations Publication, Sales No.E. 75.1I.D.1)
TD/B/C.6/7. The Reverse Transfer of Technology: Its Dimensions, Econ­
17
omic Effects and Policy Implications: Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat.
TD/B/C.6/28 TD/B/C/C.6/AC.4/10. Report of the Group of Government 
Experts on Reverse Transfer of Technology, held at the Palais des Nations, 
Geneva, from 27 February to 7 March 1978.
TD/B/C.6/41. Development Aspects of the Reverse Transfer of Technol­
ogy: Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat.
TD/B/C.6/AC.4/2. The Reverse Transfer of Technology (brain drain): In­
ternational Resource Flow Accounting, Compensation, Taxation and re­
lated Policy Proposals: study by Professor J.N. Bhagwati.
TD/B/C.6/AC.4/3. Case Studies in Reverse T ransfer of Technology (Brain 
Drain): A Survey of Problems and Policies in Pakistan: Study by Professor
S.M. Naseeni.
TD/B/C.6/AC.4/4. Idem. - A Survey of Problems and Policies in Sri 
Lanka: Study prepared by the Marga Iastitute, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
TD/B/C.6/AC.4/5. Idem. - A Survey of Problems and Policies in the Phil­
ippines: Study by Mrs. Loretta Makasiar Sicat.
TD/B/C.6/AC.4/6. Idem. - A Survey of Problems and Policies in India: 
Study by the Secretariat of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
of India.
TD/B/C.6/AC.4/7. Legal and Administrative Aspects of Compensation, 
Taxation and related Policy measures; suggestions for an optimal policy 
mix; Study by Dr. Richard Pomp and Dr. Oliver Oldman.
CTD/B/C.6/AC.4/8/Rev.l. Co-operative Exchange of Skills among De­
veloping Countries: Policies for Collective Self-reliance (United Nations 
Publication, Sales No.E.79.II.D. 1).
23. Markus Schladt. Op. cit.
24. Markus Schladt. Ibid.
25. Markus Schladt. Ibid.
18
26. UNCTAD Publication. TD/B/C.6/47. 1979.
27. Murk us Schladt. Op. cit.
28. Quoted here Irom UNCTAD Bulletin. No. 215. October 1985.
29. See UNCTAD Bulletin. No. 195.
30. UNCTAD Bulletin. No.215. Op. cit. Attention has been drawn to the 
fact that at the 1985 meeting as well as in two previous ones, developed 
countries which have been the main recipients of the international brain 
drain have absented themselves. Turkey has been the exception. Finland 
and Norway attended the 1985 meeting, but without taking any active part. 
Developed brain drain recipient countries have resisted attendance because 
of tlie General Assembly Resolution 37/207 relating to tlie proposal to es­
tablish an international labour compensatory facility. Developed countries 
are firmly oppposed to any consideration being accorded to such a facility. 
These di Hiculties are being encountered notwithstanding the fact that in De­
cember 1984, the General Assembly of the U.N. in its Resolution 39/21 1 
invited the Secretary-General of the U.N. to undertake intensive consult­
ations with governments and regional bodies with a view of securing full 
participation at subsequent meetings of experts on the reverse transfer of 
technology. The consultations were undertaken on his behalf by the OITicer- 
in-Charge of UNCTAD.
31. UNCTAD Bulletin. No.215. Ibid.
32. UNCTAD Publicution. TD/B/AC.35/12. 1985.
33. Proceedings; Experts’ Meeting, Reverse Transfer of Technology 
UNCTAD. 26th August -  4th September, 1985.
34. See The Brain Drain: Emigration and Return. Oxford. Pergamon Press 
for UNITAR. 1978.
35. See. The Reverse Transfer of Technology. A Survey of its Main Fea­
tures, Causes and Policy Implications UNCTAD Publication. TD/B/C.6/47.
36. Ibid. The UNCT AD has over the past decade been examining the possi­
bilities which this trend opens up for cooperation for mutual advantage,
19
based on four notions: Framework of approach is set out, predicated on 
lour basic elements: i) identifying specific areas of co-operation; ii) ensur­
ing reciprocity and preferential arrangements in skill exchanges among de­
veloping countries iii) defining agreed norms of employment of developing 
country personnel in other developing countries; and iv) establishing an in­
stitutional structure for tackling these tasks.
37. See. M.R. Bhagavan. Technological Transformation of Developing 
Countries. SARECReport. R4. 1984. Stockholm. 1984. p.26. See also, Co- 
operative Exchange o f Skills Among Developing Countries UNCTAD Pub­
lication. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/8. 1978.
38. Adela Pellegrino. Argentinians in Venezuela.In Alfredo E. Lattes and 
Enrique Oteiza, (ed). The Dynamics o f Argentine Migration (1955-1984). 
Democracy and the Return o f Expatriates. UNRISD, Geneva. 1987.
39. Interview. Ghanaian Government Representative. Harare. August 
29th. 1987.
40. Interview, Ghanaian U.N. Expert. Nairobi. November 5th. 1987.
20
The South African Homelands
One of the most important and essential pillars ol the South Alrican sys­
tem of institutionalized "Baaskap" or Apartheid philosophy, is the Home­
land system. While racist notions of social organization have been a 
remarkable feature of South African society from the earliest years of white 
settlement, tlie Apartheid System as we currently know it, i.s of fairly recent 
vintage, and is traceable to policies developed with the rise of National Party 
power in 1948.'
As Selby has textually demonstrated, the idea of parallel instutitions and 
separate development are of considerable age. Cecil Rhodes gave it a try 
when the Cape Colony developed local institutions for Africans in the Glen 
Grey Reserve. It was later adapted to the Transkei area. Lord Milner’s 
choice of Sir Godfrey Lagden as Chairman of the South African Native Af­
fairs Commission in 1903 resulted in a report recommending the separation 
of black and white as voters and land occupiers. In an appendix to the 
Act of Union, Lord Selbome formulated that "native territories in South Af­
rica should be governed apart from the parliamentary institutions and on 
different lines, so as to achieve the principle of native self-government". 
Smut’s view on these matters deserves lengthy and eloquent recall.
We have realized that political ideas which apply to our 
White civilization largely do not apply to the administration 
of Native affairs...and so a practice has grown up in South 
Africa of creating parallel institutions - giving the Natives 
their own separate institutions on parallel lines with institu­
tions for Whites. It may be that on those parallel lines we 
may yet be able to solve a problem which may otherwise be 
insoluble...Instead of mixing up Black and White in the old 
hapliazard way, wliich instead of lilting up the Black de-
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graded the Whites, we are now trying to lay down a policy of 
keeping them apart as much as possible in our institutions.
In land ownership, settlement and forms of government we 
are trying to keep apart, and in that way laying down in out­
line a general policy which it may take a hundred years to 
work out, but which in the end may be the solution of our Na­
tive problem. Thus in South Africa you will have in the long 
run large areas cultivated by Blacks and governed by Blacks, 
where they will look alter themselves in all their forms of liv­
ing and development, while in suitable parts you will have 
your White communities which will govern themselves sep­
arately according to the accepted European principles. The 
Blacks will, of course be free to go and to work in the While 
areas, but as far as possible the White and Black areas will 
be separate, and such that each community will be satisfied 
and developed according to its own proper lines.4
With specific reference to the Homeland system, its early origins have 
been traced to the recommendation of the South African Inter-Colonial Na­
tive Affairs Commission of 1903-1905, relating to the partition and segre­
gation of land and people in the country. The central object of the 
recommendations of this Commission was to stop and exclude Africaas 
from the increasing acquisition of land in predominantly white-owned and 
white-settled areas.
The protection of African interests in land was not a feature of these rec­
ommendations. As Blausten has rightly indicated, the Natives Land Act of 
1913 gave a concrete and manifest institutional framework for the recom- 
mendatioas, by designating particular areas already largely under firm Af­
rican occupation to Africans, and legally excluding or prohibiting Africans 
from land acquisition rights in most areas of the country. Two decades later, 
in 1936, the Bantu Land and Trust Act, formulated the apportionment of 
"native reserves" which in historical effect laid down "the territorial basis 
of separate development". This latter notion and line of policy ultimately 
created conditions under which Africans herded into Bantustans had de jure
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access to only 13.7 percent of the country.5
While most Africans living in and out of the South African Homelands ac­
cept the phenomenology of the Bantustans as a fact of life, the general pic­
ture obtained during interviews in the course of the present study reveal that 
the Bantustan concept is rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Black 
people of South Africa. The Homeland system is veiwed as a racist social 
contrivance entrenching the reality of African land dispossession, political 
subjugation and disenfranchisement, and the sociological inferiority of the 
African within the Apartheid state and its class structures. In the light of 
these points and the increasing popular stridency of Af rican nationalist re­
sistance in South Africa, it is shortsighted and highly apologetic to suggest 
that;
The Black Homelands of South Africa are there to stay. They 
are a political fact established by a government that has the 
overwhelming strength to impose its authority. It is only 
through the full exploitation of the Homelands concept that 
the Africans can develop politically and economically. De­
nied for years any means of effecting fundamental political 
change in South Africa, the Africans at last have a means of 
doing this.6
This arguement implicitly accepts the permanence of the structure of the 
Apartheid state in South Africa. Equally misplaced is Gwendolen Carter’s 
proposal for the partition of South Africa.
As has been earlier stated, the Homelands system represents the flower, 
of the Apartheid system. The creation of so-called self-governing and ul­
timately "independent" homelands, for blacks has been the strategic objec­
tive of the South African government’s policy of Apartheid or separate 
development. The formula was conceived by Dr. Verwoerd, who was 
Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966. It was conceptualized 
as an instrument for the dominance of Afrikaner nationalism constituted as 
class rule within the capitalist state. During the 1950s and 60s it continued
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lo oiler some room lor the development of productive forces. By the 
1970s, it had become a millstone around the neck of South African capital­
ism. Through the divide-and-rule method Africans have been fragmented 
into ten sub-ethnicities and an attempt is made to cultivate ruling groups 
and lineages to serve as civil custodians of Pretoria-delegated praetorian 
guards, and patronized stale power. The unspoken object of this policy ol 
grand apartheid is to ensure that "there no longer exists an African majority 
in South Africa".9 This is the only viable constitution for whitc-minority 
rule. Thus the Bantustan strategy of the Apartheid philosophy attempts in 
practice the "reincorporation of a modified form ol tribal authority struc­
ture into the overall structure of domination", with chiefs acting as paid 
agents of the South African state.10 The ruling groups and lineage clusters 
cultivated within the Bantustans are in effect a nascent petty bourgeoisie 
nurtured through the largesse of the South African state, in order to preserve 
"a reserve army of labour", in latter day "Native Reserves". These Bantus- 
tans are meant to provide the conditions forthe cheapest reproduction ol la­
bour power and labour time for South African industry. This offers higher 
rates of profit for a capitalist system still heavily dependent on international 
investment for more organically advanced capitalism.11
8
Forging Bantustans:
Until 1913, Africans were allowed to acquire land outside "Native Reser­
ves". The Natives Land Act of that year pul an end to the practice, except 
in those areas which had been variously, so designated by the authorities. 
Furthermore, the Act "recognized" the Native Reserves by apportioning and 
sanctioning areas of African occupation not totalling more than 7.3 percent 
of tlie total land area of South Africa. Initially the courts adjudicated that 
the prohibition of African land purchase rights was untenable in the Cape. 
However the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 extended the prohibition 
to tiie whole country except for those areas excluded from the prohibition 
in accordance to the terms of the Act. In addition the 1936 Act designated
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15.25 million acres which could gradually over time be added on to the
Reserves through purchases undertaken by the South African Bantu Trust12and individual Africans. " In total about 14 million acres were released, this 
included State-owned land held in trust. By 1976, 2.3 million acres ol the 
1936 apportionment was still technically available for purchase as additions 
to the Homelands.
Territorial separatism was followed by the institution of separate govern­
mental structures and a separate franchise. In some areas, particularly in 
the Transkei local councils had been in force for decades. In the Transkei, 
District Councils were instituted in 1894. The council system operative in 
the Trankei was expanded into other African areas by the Native Affairs 
Act of 1920.
Africans and Coloured males with certain defined economic and educa­
tional qualifications had since 1853 been on the Common Electoral Roll in 
the Cape. These rights obtained also in Natal although to a more limited 
extent. While the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 withdrew the right of 
Africans in the Cape to acquire land outside the Reserves, the Representa­
tion of Natives Act of tlie same year abolished African access to the Com­
mon Electoral Roll in the Cape, and placed them in a separate roll with the 
right to elect three white members of the House of Assembly and two white 
members of the Cape Provincial Council. Africans throughout South Afri­
ca were given rights to elect four while Senators through the agency of elec­
toral colleges consisting of Headmen and Chiefs. In addition the 1936 
Representation of Natives Act established a Natives Representative Coun­
cil, conceived as an advisory body, in-part nominated and in-pait elected, 
on which a total of 16 Africans would sit with white native commissioners, 
chaired by the Secretary for Native Affairs. As has been noted, it was "the
first and last official body that recognized that Africans had interests in com- 
it 13mon . The Native Laws Amendment Act, Act 46 of 1937, made a begin­
ning of the establishment of Black townships in areas outside the 
Homelands. The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, Act 25 of 1945 
controlled the movement of Blacks to the urban areas.14 The Bantu Auth­
orities Act, Act 68 of 1951 in effect superseded the Natives Representative
25
Council. It was one of the early and most important measures undertaken 
by the National Party administration to establish the structure of Apartheid. 
By this Act, various levels of government were created in the Homelands.
For each group regarded by the authorities as "a tribe", a Tribal Authority 
was established. More than one Tribal Authority could constitute a Com­
munity Authority, and a Regional Authority consisted of a combination of 
two or more Tribal and, or, Community Authorities. A Territorial Auth­
ority defined a whole Native area. The Territorial Authority interfaced with 
the Commissioner-General for each area in an advisory capacity.1 May- 
lam has argued that die Tomlinson Commission Report of 1954 had sug­
gested a wide-ranging job creation programme in the Native Reserves, 
which would serve the purpose of holding Africans in the reserves, and 
checking the How of African migrants to the white urban enclaves. The 
government however was in hindsight unwilling to provide the investment 
required for such a job creation programme [ 16]
It was Dr. Verwoeixl who as Minister of Native Affairs from 1950 to 1958 
when he became Prime Minister, laid the foundations of modem South Af­
rican institutionalized racism under the Apartheid system. His vision of the 
ethnic fragmentation of the Africans was based on the recognition that this 
was the only way of maintaining Baaskap.
An important instrument lie forged for this objective was the Promotion 
of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959. This Act was premised on the ration­
ale diat tlie African people of South Africa do not constitute a homogene­
ous racial category, but rather are made up of distinct and separate ethnic or 
national units based on language and culture. Furthermore, the develop­
ment and welfare of these ethnic and sub-ethnic groups was to be pursued
along lines which would ensure the steady but gradual evolution towards
17so-called self-government. Regarding this Act Verwoerd commented 
that:
My belief is that the development of South Africa on the basis 
of this Bill will create so much friendship, so much gratitude, 
so many mutual interests in the propulsive development that
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there will be no danger of hostile Bantu states, but that there 
will arise what I call a commonwealth, founded on common 
interests and linked together by common interests in this 
southern part of Africa. In other words, I believe that these 
dangers of foreign ideologies, of foreign navies and so on, 
will not materialize.18
The Act defined eight Bantu "national units" and formulated more tightly 
than hitherto, the constitutional powers of tribal, regional and territorial 
powers according to the provisions of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. 
The Act established the appointment of CominLssioner-Generals to repre­
sent the white-minority government in the Bantustans. Representatives of 
Territorial Authorities were to be appointed to administer the urban areas. 
The provisions of the 1936 Act providing for African parliamentary repre­
sentation was scrapped. In pursuit of the Verwoerd vision, in 1963, the 
Transkei Constitution Act devolved some powers to the Bantustan admin­
istration with its own so-called Legislative Assembly led by Chief Minis­
ter Keizer Matanzima.19 This Act asserted that, all Xhosa and Sotho 
language speakers of "Traaskeian origin" were Transkei an citizens.
Ciskei and Tswana Territorial Authorities were instituted in 1961, and 
analogous institutions were established for the Southern Sotho, Northern 
Sotho, Venda and Shangaan in 1969. An equivalent for the Zulu was es­
tablished in 1970. The Transkei Constitution Act required that all Xhosa 
and Sotho-speaking Africans who were designated as Transkei citizens lose 
their South African citizenship. This provision applied immediately to over 
1,300,000 Africans who were located outside the Homeland. A good pro­
portion of them had been bom and brought up outside the Homeland. The 
non-recognition of the Homeland by the international community in effect 
meant that Homeland citizens are stateless. The Bantu States Citizenship 
Act of 1970 affirmed the idea that every African within the territorial area 
of South Africa must be a citizen of a homeland irrespective of where he 
may be living within the borders of South Africa. This Act was followed
by the Bantu States Constitution Act, Act 21, of 1971 which opened the way
20for the possibility of so-called self-government for the Bantustans. The
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conferment of such status was vested in the State President. This Act also 
established Legislative and Executive Councils for all the Bantustans.
The evolution of the Bantustans have been since then such that today there 
are 10 Bantustans, classified according to the so-called constitutional de­
velopment into "independent" homelands and "self-governing" homelands. 
The "independent" homelands are supposed to be Ciskei, Bophuthatswana,
Transkei, and Venda, and the "self-governing" homelands are Gazankulu,
21Kangwane, Kwa-Ndebele, Kwazulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa.
Bophuthatswana was granted a Legislative Council on 1st June 1972 with 
Lucas Mangope as leader. It became "independent" on the 6th December 
1977, about a year after the Transkei which was granted "independent" 
status on the 26th October 1976. Elections in Venda for the Legislative 
Council were held on the 15th and 16th August 1973, and "independent" 
status was accorded as from the 13th September 1979. In the Ciskei, the 
elections for the Legislative Council were first held from the 19th to the 
23rd of February 1973, and "independent" status came into effect from the 
4th December 1981 22
With regards to the so-called "self-governing" homelands which have as 
it were not achieved "independence", Gazankulu which was formerly 
referred to as Mashangana Territorial Authority was given a Legislative 
Council in July 1971, and became "self-governing" in February 1973. 
Kangwane established its Legislative Council in October 1977 and became 
a "self-governing state" in 1984. Kwa-Ndebele also became "self-govem- 
ing" in the same year. Kwazulu was granted the status of a "self-governing 
state" in March 1972. Its Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi has consistent­
ly refused to accept so-called "independence". In the tide of the rising popu­
lar resistance to Apartheid, in recent years, many inhabitants of the 
homelands are rejecting more defiantly the notion of "independence". Dur­
ing 1987 resistance to this in KwaNdebele exploded into violent confron­
tation between pro and contra elements on the issue. The Lovedu homeland 
of Lebowa was extended "self-government" status in September 1972. 
Qwaqwa, the smallest of the Bantustans perched on the northeast comer of 
the Lesotho border was given a Legislative Council in October 1971 and
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"self-governing" status in 1974.
Puppet Administrations:
Throughout Africa and tl»e wider world it is generally surmised that the 
South African Homelands administrations are puppet structures of the 
Pretoria regime, put in place in order to give a longer lease on life to die 
white-minority rule system in South Africa. The homelands system is main­
tained through subsidies and largesse from Pretoria. It is important to note 
that no homeland administration is in a serious sense represent it ive of die 
people falling under its administration. Half or more of the seats in each 
Legislative Assembly are solely restricted to Chiefs. Again only 14 percent 
of the tlien estimated 5 million registered to vote. The implicit support which 
the Homelands administrations by their very exislance give to die Apartheid 
system makes them unpopular with the African population of South Afri­
ca. Their active collusion with and actions in support of the Soudi African 
security services has invariably put them on a collision course with the 
movements for liberation in Soudi Africa. While many of the homeland 
leaders have their differences with die Pretoria regime, and often give voice 
to this, die common ground diey share in giving credibility to the Apartheid 
system depicts them in die eyes of the wider world as collaborators in the 
racist system of oppression which die Apartheid state represents. Migrants 
from independent Africa, who form the subject of this present study are, 
along the above line of reasoning, seen as elements buttressing and helping 
to make die Apartheid system work at the level of die Homelands set-up.
In view of the general universal isolation of South Africa, and die interna­
tional non-recognition of the Homelands, the Homeland leaders have been 
at pains to attract and cultivate foreign expertise and capital. Highly trained 
African migrants in search of lucrative employment are drawn to the Home­
lands. As Schrire has pointed out, "partly because of a scarcity of trained 
blacks, whites continue to fill many of the important administrative posi­
tions and the vitally important activities of the various economic develop-
23 . .
ment corporations are outside their control". There are however positions
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in the teaching (Secondary and Tertiary), medical and para-medical ser­
vices, and technical expertise which attract highly trained and skilled Afri­
cans from independent Africa. Most of these positions are not particularly 
attractive for whites. The dearth of trained expertise is further aggravated 
by the p ost-1976 levels of white South African emigration.
The fact that many highly skilled migrants to the South African homelands 
endeavour to keep their work association with the Bantustans quiet and 
possibly secret to the wider world, indicates fundamental discomfiture with 
the wider implications of their work association. The support and services 
they offer to the maintenance of the homeland system is growing in size as 
their numbers increase.
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The Dimensions
Two categories of people can be identified in the phenomenon of brain 
and talent drain to the Bantustans. There are firstly, those whose countries 
of origin are in the Southern African region, especially from Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. People from the region, particularly from these 
three countries have a long established practice of working in South Afri­
ca, although the overwhelming majority of people from these three coun­
tries working in South Africa have been semi-skilled and unskilled 
labourers employed mainly in the mines. The nationalities from which these 
people are drawn straddle their common borders with South Africa, and 
many have immediate kinship ties with South Africans.
It is indeed ethno-linguistically difficult or near impossible to distinguish 
them from South Africans. Brain drain from the BLS countries into South 
Africa has been a feature of these countries for decades, and is difficult to 
measure precisely in either quantitative or qualitative terms. South Africa 
economically dominates the region, providing goods, services, capital re­
source base, and a labour market for the region. But for Apartheid, and 
white-minority rule, South Africa could provide a powerful impetus for 
growth and development throughout the region.
For some members of the intellectual elite with roots of consanguinity in 
both South Africa and their native countries, employment is sought where 
opportunities provide the most lucrative returns and some are able to ex­
ploit to great personal advantage their more or less dual citizenship rights. 
The significance of the borders is psychologically minimal. Many were edu­
cated in South Africa and spent a good part of their youth and formative 
years in the Republic of South Africa. In the post-colonial era, some have 
accepted positions in the independent states of Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland because they provide opportunities of employment and status
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which are barred from them in South Africa.
The economic forces which integrate them as a region is such that both 
skilled and unskilled labour movement have been part and parcel of life. At 
the level of Monetaiy and Fiscal Cooperation, the Customs Union has been 
an important instrument for regional economic relations.1 The Rand Mon­
etary Area is another important integrative economic instrument in the re- 
gion.lt includes South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland in an arrangement 
through which the South African Reserve Bank in Pretoria acts ultimately 
as a central clearing bank for the members of the monetary union. Exten­
sive relations exist between South Africa and the rest of the region. Few Af­
rican countries admit to trade relations with the Apartheid regime. However 
the South African authorities have claimed that in 1983 alone, for example, 
South African exports to the rest of Africa amounted to about R1800 mil­
lion, which is about 10 percent of the total exports of South Africa Imports 
amounted to R400 million or 2.5 percent of her total imports.3
The South African authorities further claim that for the same year there 
was a reciprocal flow of goods between 47 African states and the Republic 
of South Africa4 Extensive trade relations exist between Zaire, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and the Republic of South Africa 
On the average, per annum, South Africa supplies over 90 percent of con­
sumer goods for the BLS countries. In the face of these realities, labour mi­
gration from the rest of the region into South Africa, both at the unskilled 
and highly skilled levels is not a surprising phenomenon. Much as this phe­
nomenon goes against the grain of global international sensibilities and 
moral indignation against the racist Apartheid System, Pretoria claims that 
by 1985, there were 350,000 foreign Blacks legally employed in South Af­
rica.
The major countries of origin being Lesotho (139,000), Mozambique 
(60,000), Malawi (30,000), Botswana (2,000) and Swaziland (17,000).5 
These figures refer to semi-skilled and unskilled labourers. The South Af­
rican authorities further contend that foreign Blacks living and working il­
legally in South Africa far exceed the legal "guest workers".6 While these 
illegal workers come from countries all over the region, they are mostly
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from Mozambique, Lesoliio, Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.
With salary scales in South Africa considerably higher than elsewhere 
within the region, a whole range of migrants are attracted into die Repub­
lic and it.s Bantustans. This is true for unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled and 
highly skilled migrants, moving from countries within the region to South 
Africa.
The second category of people that can be identified in tlie phenomenon 
of brain and talent drain to the Bantustans are those whose native countries 
lie outside tfie Southern African region. Particularly significant for the pur­
poses of this study are the highly skilled migrants from East and West Af­
rica; more specifically Uganda and Ghana respectively.
These migrants are almost exclusively highly skilled. They arc mainly sec­
ondary school teachers, lecturers and other University staff, medical doc­
tors and dentists, para-medics, and a variety of technicians, engineers, and 
planners. Tlie overwhelming majority of them are secondary school tea­
chers. Most of the upperechelons are highly qualified internationally. There 
are however some who claim qualifications they do not possess. But, be­
cause of the secrecy with which they are received and the international 
cordon sanitaire around South Africa, their academic and skills credentials 
are difficult to check. They are illegal migrants not in the sense in which 
the South African authorities define illegality, that is without registering 
their presence through the South African immigration authorities. Rather 
they are in South Africa illegally in the sense that, their governments pro­
hibit them by law to seek employment or even visit South Africa. They are 
therefore forced to hide their presence in South Africa to the wider world, 
and many adopt elaborate means and measures to as it were "cover their 
tracks".
Measures to "cover their tracks" include travelling by road to either Bot­
swana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and flying out of these latter countries 
wlienever they travel out on home leave. With immigration stamps from 
the BLS countries, they pretend these are their countries of employment. It 
is a common sight to see Ghanaians or Ugandans from the Bantustans at
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Gaborone, Matsapa, and Moshoeshoe I airports, Hying out into independent 
Africa. At these airports, and in flight, tliey are particularly sensitive and 
nervous about questions alluding to their stay in the Bantustans.
Many of the Ghanaians are elements who previously worked in Nigeria 
("Agege") during the oil-boom years. With the collapse of the oil economy 
they moved southwards where remunerations for work and openings were 
more favourable. Some moved first from Nigeria to other countries in the 
Southern African region, particularly, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and 
Zimbabwe. Subsequently the attraction of better rewards drew them into 
the borders of South Africa.
This practice has gone on to the extent that, for example in Lesotho, the 
Teaching Service authorities are quietly unhappy about accepting Gha­
naians and Ugandans into employment for fear that they will move into 
South Africa at the earliest opportunity and without warning.
Years of war, and a war-shattered economy in Uganda, have stimulated 
many Ugandans to move southwards into South Africa for employment. 
Their patterns of behaviour with regards to the sensitivities of working in 
South Africa are similar to the Ghanaians. In the course of the research for 
this study, it was found that the practice of migration from Uganda to the 
Bantustans is so far "institutionalized" that there are, currently operating in 
Kampala and Nairobi, agents and touts who quietly provide information on 
employment opportunities in the Bantustans and facilitate movement, for 
fees.7
The precise numbers of highlly skilled migrants from independent Africa 
working in the Bantustans of South Africa are difficult to come-by. How­
ever, estimates obtained from various sources suggest that their total num­
bers are about 7,000. The migrants from the BLS countries are about 3,000 
and Ugandans, Ghanaians, Zambians, Zimbabweans, and Mauritians num­
ber about 3,500. The Bantustan and Pretoria authorities ensure that their 
stay is not indicated in their passports.
Ghanaians and Ugandans form about 60% of the highly skilled migrants 
from Africa. Their contribution in maintaining various services in the Ban-
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tustans is considerable, and in the medical and teaching services, crucial. In 
one hospital in Thaba Nchu (Bophuthatswana) 7 of the 18 medical officers 
and paramedics are Ugandans. The medical services of the Bantustans are 
well represented with Ugandans in particular. An increasing number of 
Ghanaians and Ugandans are moving into the Universities as academics and 
librarians. Among the prominent Ghanaians can be found Nico Asante, a 
fonner Regional Director of Education, (Ashanti Region) now in Transkei; 
N ico Anim, former Director-General of the Ghana Teaching Service, in the 
Transkei; Kwasi Nsarko, of the University of Bophuthatswana, a former 
professor in local government, University of Ghana, Commissioner of 
Local Government, and previously a lecturer at the Winneba Ideological 
Institute during the Nkrumahera; the medicus Wilson, of the University of 
Transkei.
As part of the strategy of breaking out of the stranglehold of the interna­
tional handsoff policy towards the Bantustans, the Bantustan authorities 
went out of their way from the onset of their so-called "independence" peri­
od to court other Africans and the international community, in order to 
achieve some measure of recognition outside South Africa. They appear to 
have failed, but not in attracting some capital and labour. Apart from South 
African capital, some infusion has come from the West, and the Far East.
There are only poor opportunities for unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled 
labour. Highly skilled labour of various types are in short supply and the 
Bantustans provide material rewards difficult to rival elsewhere in Africa. 
The currency is harder than anywhere in Africa
The clash of these factors has resulted in the most economically debili­
tated of the relatively more educated African states serving as source coun­
tries for highly skilled migrants.
While most of these migrants are on 2-3 year contracts. Some of them have 
permanent contracts which provide them indefinate stay in employment.
The breakdown of expatriates in the employ of the Transkei Departments 
of Education and Health is revealing.
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EXPATRIATES: PI-IT. OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION TKANS-
KEI 19X7-88 
Nationality Dept, of Ed
Ugandans X9
Indians 137
Ghanaians 226
Brit is!) 15
Sri Lankans 36
Pakistanis 3
Zambians 2
Canadians 1
Sotho 19
Australians 1
Bangladeshi 2
Zimbabweans 2
Americans 4
Italians 1
Filipinos 1
Swiss 1
Mauritians 3
Kenyans 1
Irish 4
Belgians 1
Polish 1
Germans 5
Angolans 1
S. Africans -
Dutch -
Yugoslavians -
Hungarians -
Argentinians -
Dept. of Health 
Doc. & Dents Pharmacists 
49 
IX
23 I
6
9 I
I
5
I
5
2
3
1
6
3
16
5
1
1
1
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Bolivians
Nepalese
Swazis
Iranians -  1
*In addition to the above, there are 5 Ugandan Medical Technologists 
and I Ugandan Radiographer.
Ugandans among African highly skilled expatriates arc particularly well 
represented in the Department of Agriculture and Forestry.
EXPATRIATES: DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY. 
TRANSKEI
1. AGRICULTURE 
NO. DESIGNATION ORIGIN QUALIFICATIONS
1 Chief Professional Officer Uganda 
1 Professional Officer Uganda
B.Sc. M.Sc., Ph.D. 
B.Sc.
2. FORESTRY/CONSERVATION
1 Senior Professional Officer Czech. B.Sc. Diploma.
3. VET1NARY SERVICES
1 State Vet. Uganda B.V.M. Ch.
1 State Vet. Uganda Degree Vet. Medicine
1 State Vet. Portugal B.V.M. Ch.
1 Director of Vet. Services Iran M.Sc. (Vet. Medicine)
1 State Vet. Uganda B.V.M. Ch.
1 State Vet. Uganda B.V.M. Ch.
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I State Vet. Uganda B.V.M. Ch.,EAACE
I State Vet. Uganda B.V.M. Ch.
I State Vet. Portugal B.V.M. Ch.
I State Vet. Germany B.V.M. Ch.
4. ENGINEERING SERVICES
1 Inspector of Works Australia Trade Training Cert
1 Engineer R.S.A. B.Sc. Agric-Eng.
1 Industrial Technician Poland Std 10 + Diploma
1 Engineer Australia B.Sc. Civil Eng.
1 Engineer U.S.A. B.Sc. (Engineer)
1 Engineer Iran B.Sc. Civil Eng.
1 Engineer R.S.A. B.Sc. Engineering
1 Director Eng. Services Iran Dip. Maths, B.Sc.
1 Senior Drilling Inspector R.S.A. Senior Certificate
1 Deputy Director Eng. Iran B.Sc. Civil Eng.
1 Artisan (Mechanical) R.S.A. Trade Training Cert
1 Industrial Technician Poland Std 10 + Diploma
GRAND TOTAL = 25
Figures on academic staff, for the University of Transkei show a wide dis­
tribution of origins of staff members. In reality they are distributed over the 
full range of teaching faculties in the university.
ACADEMIC STAFF ORIGINS. UN1TRA. 1983-1987
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Year Transkei & S.A. 
Black White Total
Africa Europe N.A. Asia Total
1983 50 51 109 8 14 9 9 149
1984-83 54 13 137 13 16 9 14 189
1985 103 52 155 26 15 9 7 2 2 2
1986 114 44 158 30 18 8 18 232
1987 125 37 162 37 16 3 15 233
What is also telling from the three proceeding tables is the fact that Africa 
is not the only source of highly trained migrants moving into the Bantus­
tans 8 As the following table reveals for the year 1985, the overwhelming 
majority of applicants for temporary work and study permits in Bophuthat­
swana were Europeans, and other westerners.
Highly skilled migrants started moving into the South African Homelands 
in 1976-77. From small beginnings in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, 
by 1980 the tide was rising. With the South African rand in those days 
stronger than the U.S. dollar the attraction for highly skilled migrants from 
independent Africa was considerable.
As the Hood into the Bantustans continued, African governments became 
increasingly embarrassed and apprehensive about tlx.' How of talented mi­
grants into the Bantustans.9 In September 1984, addressing members of the 
Students Democratic Front within the National University of Lesotho, the 
then Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Mr. D. T. Sixishe;
Strongly condemned youth who after graduation having been 
financially supported by public funds go to the Bantustans to 
help South Africa with the upliftment of the obnoxious sys­
tem of Bantu Education. 10
Shortly after Sixishe’s speech, the theme was picked up again in Lesotho 
by the Mafeteng District Coordinator, Mr. Halemakale M. Motsoene, dur­
ing a guest speech at Masentle High School in Mafeteng. He condemned;
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the unfortunate and selfish malpractice of those who, after 
being educated by this poor country, leave in pursuit of higher 
salaries in Bantustans and thus give strength and respect­
ability to the abhorrent system of Apartheid. 10
While the emphasis in condemnation of the brain drain in the BLS courv 
tries has been placed on the heartless selfishness of those highly skilled mi­
grants who drift into the homelands of South Africa, further north in East 
and West Africa, it is the embarrassing nature of the drift for "the good 
name" of source countries which has tended to irk the authorities.
In a news report put out by the Johannesburg Star in August 23, 1984, at­
tention was drawn to the fact that "hundreds of Ghanaian workers are Hock­
ing to South Africa’s homelands in search of jobs, acutely embarrassing the 
government of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings". This embarrassment in­
duced the Ghanaian government to stamp all Ghanaian passports as valid 
for all countries except South Africa and its Homelands. The newspaper 
report further noted that according to observers in Accra, "there is little else 
the government can do apart from condemning the latest exodus". It was 
pointed out that "Ghana’s workers make up one of the largest migrant la­
bour forces in world. But they have choked the labour markets of some 
countries, causing resentment and often resulting in expulsion". The plight 
of Ghanaian migrant workers is highlighted in recent history by an obser­
vation made by the newspaper report regarding expulsions of Ghanaians 
from host countries. Referring to 1983 the report indicated that;
Nigeria last year expelled about a million Ghanaian workers, 
and recently West Germany deported some 4,000.
The embarrassment of Ghanaian authorities is underscored by an editor­
ial in the Ghanaian Times headlined "A Twist to Exodus" which called the 
migration to South Africa a smear on Ghana’s image of a champion against 
apartheid. It read further that;
For what-ever reasons Ghanaians wish to join the exodus
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abroad, they arc free lo do so. Bui llielrail loTranskei is quite 
intolerable....Ghana cannot afford to Ik* seen lo have any as­
sociation wilh the bantuslan system in any way, because 
Ghana has gol a reputation lo maintain lor her principled 
stand against apartheid. To use Ghanaian passports in any 
exodus to Transkei or the banluslans is to give respect to the 
apartheid policy and insult our national dignity. 11
Early in 1988, the Rawlings Government restated its case regarding Gha­
naian nationals working in the South African Bantustans:
The Ghanaian government has expressed concern over the 
large number of Ghanaians residing and working in the Apar­
theid Republic of South Africa, a practice contrary to the gov­
ernment’s (Ghana’s) commitment to the struggle for the
eradication of Apartheid and the total liberation of South Af- 
12rica.
The statement further recalled that in 1987, the Ghanaian government ad­
vised the general public to stop the practice since it was embarrassing the 
government and also questions the integrity and sincerity of its policy of 
absolute commitment to the Isolation of racist South Africa. Furthermore 
it was indicated that the government of Ghana had withdrawn all consular 
services to Ghanaians living or working in South Africa. The news report
affirmed that officially, Ghanaians are not allowed to live or work in the
1 3Republic of South Africa or its Bantustans. ' That is the law. In reality, 
Ghanaians and Ugandans migrating to the Bantustans have developed 
routes for entrance. In Lesotho the Tele Bridge has over the past few years 
been the favourite route into the Transkei. The route to Bophuthatswana 
runs through Botswana, at the various border gates opening on to the South 
African Bantustan. Relatively generous economic rewards in Bophuthat­
swana are increasingly attracting migrants.
The era of active courtship is however over. Homeland leaders increas­
ingly debate publicly the influx of aliens. Complaints have been publicly
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registered in Mabatho. In the Transkei it is not infrequent. For example on 
the 5 July 1983;
Wide-ranging calls for tighter control of entry to Transkei of 
aliens, expatriates and white South Africans were made in the 
National Assembly.... , 14
After a scathing attack on the employment of white managers in corpora­
tions and semi-government bodies, the M.P. for Umtata, Mr. Mike Mazwa- 
na went on to reportedly ask whether aliens coming to the Transkei would 
not become too entrenched, and referred to Nigeria where a million Gha­
naians had to be expelled.
This will obtain here as we have Ghanaians here now. They 
come to work here and act as recruiting officers for their 
friends back home. 15
Suggested K. W. Tamsanqa. Turning to another set of aliens, the Indians, 
Tamsanqa asserted that there were plenty of foreigners, especially Indians, 
in the Department of Education.
He did not know how they came into the country. He could 
not understand how whites from Zimbabwe got in either.
One white had said he had a degree and was at Blythswood.
It was later found he only had a police diplom a16
The Ciskei is also collecting a contigent of skilled migrants from inde­
pendent Africa. In Venda, Indians, Pakistanis and Filipinos have been ar­
riving since 1980 in a steady stream. More recently some of the highly 
skilled migrants have been moving from the South African Bantustans into 
Namibia. 1 Some of the migrants have taken opportunity of institutions of 
learning to further improve their qualifications. They are to be found in sev­
eral South African Universities.
From the National University of Lesotho, during the last eight years 15
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local stall'members have left for different work destinations in the Bantus­
tans. The number for African expatriates who have left tlie National Univer­
sity of Lesotho for the Bantustans over the same period is 12. The attraction 
for most of these people are the considerably higher financial rewards of­
fered in the Bantustans.
The following table giving comparative salary figures for academics in 
Umtata and Roma is indicative.
ACADLM1C SALARIES (LESOTHO AND TRANSKEI S.A.) IN 
RANDS. 1988-
Post______________NUL Salaries________ UN1TRA Salaries
Assistant Lecturer 14628.00 17724.00
Or 15120.00 18423.00
Junior Lecturer 15612.00 19386.00
20349.00
21312.00
22275.00
26127.00
Lecturer 18816.00
19584.00
20352.00
21120.00 
21888.00
22656.00
23424.00
24192.00
24960.00
25728.00
23979.00
25341.00
26700.00
28059.00
29598.00
31137.00
32676.00
34215.00
35754.00
37344.00
38931.00
Senior Lecturer 25788.00 31137.00
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26892.00
27996.00
29100.00
30204.00
32676.00
34215.00
35754.00
37344.00
38931.00
40551.00
Associate Professor 30936.00 35754.00
32352.00 37344.00
33768.00 38931.00
40551.00
42168.00
43785.00
Professor 34992.00 42168.00
36396.00 43785.00
37800.00 45402.00
47022.00
48858.00
50697.00
Conclusion
From the late 1970s onwards a steady stream of highly skilled migrants 
have been flowing into the South African Bantustans. There is however 
among the Africans a preponderance of Ugandans and Ghanaians. Initially 
they were courted by the Bantustan authorities but as social and economic 
constraints increase on South Africa, and with most of the openings filled 
in the Bantustans, competition with locals and rivalry is fast developing. 
One of the consequences of this is that an anti-foreigner rhetoric is slowly 
building-up. While most of the migrants are likely to return to their source 
countries sooner or later, some are bound to make permanent homes in the 
South African Bantustans.
This is likely to increase familiarity and interaction between Africans, a 
process most Africans tend to welcome. However whatever measure of such
47
interaction is achieved, it is at a price the international community today 
deplores. The presence of foreigners and other Africans in the Bantustans 
as highly skilled employees strengthens the Apartheid system at the level 
of the Bantustan structure.
NOTES
1. South Africa and the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swazi­
land) are members of the Southern African Customs Union. The treaty pro­
vides for the free flow of goods and services among member states, which 
levy the same tariffs on goods imported from outside the customs area.
In 1982-83 the following amounts of money were disbursed to the BLS 
countries, under the terms of the treaty: Botswana; R116 million, Lesotho; 
R71 million, Swaziland; M l 17 million.
These figures, for the respective years account for 32 percent (Botswana), 
37 percent (Lesotho) and 61 percent (Swaziland) of total revenue. See 
South Africa: Mainstay o f Southern Africa. Pretoria. 1985. p. 15.
2. Lesotho and Swaziland hold most of their foreign reserves as Rand bal­
ances, invested in the South African money market The treaty provides for 
a uniform exchange control system. Swaziland and Lesotho have open ac­
cess to the South African capital markets. See, South Africa : Mainstay o f 
Southern Africa. Ibid. p. 16.
3. Ibid. p.16.
4. Ibid p. 16. Kobus Meiring, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister in the 
Pretoria regime.
5. South Africa has used this dependence of the region on its labour mar­
ket to frequently threaten that if sanctions against her are imposed in any 
serious form, she would be inclined to "retaliate" by repatriating these 
foreign workers back to their countries of origin.
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See also; Joanmarie Kalter. The Economic Squeeze. Africa Report. Sept- 
Oct., 1984. p.67.
6 . South Africa : M ainstay o f Southern Africa. Op cit. p.4. The propagan­
da claim of the South African regime is that "the benefits accruing to the 
neighbouring countries go far beyond quantifiable earnings and contribu­
tions to gross national product
Employment of both legal and illegal workers in South Africa relieves the 
pressure on their labour markets to an enormous extent. This in turn pro­
motes social and political stability in the countries concerned. Ibid. p.5.
7. Interview. F. B. 19.6.87. Makerere University. Kampala.
8 . At a meeting held in Maseru on the 3.10.88, the Indian High Commis­
sioner for Lesotho based in Maseru revealed that, the Indian Government 
is unhappy about the drift of Indians into the Bantustans.
Attempts have been made to secure precise information on numbers and 
the identity of Indian nationals in the Bantustans, but this has so far proven 
to be a very difficult exercise. A good number of the Indians presently em­
ployed in the homelands have previously worked in Nigeria.
In a sense, their case is very similar to the Ghanaian migrants who have 
drifted southwards from Nigeria. As has been earlier indicated this group 
constitutes a sizeable proportion of the Ghanaians in the Bantustans.
The number of Mauritians and Filipinos is also increasing rapidly. The 
Southscan of 19.10.88 divulges that for decades the South African auth­
orities have disallowed any kind of oriental immigration. But with the rise 
of Japanese trade, the notion of "the customer is always white" was culti­
vated and the Japanese were given "honorary white" status in the Apartheid 
racial pantheon.
In the last half-decade immigration from the East has been opened up, and 
Chinese migrants are coming in from mainly Taiwan but also Hong Kong.
The Homeland decentralization points or the former border industries are
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their prime economic targets. Massive incentives are offered to industrial­
ists to set up enterprises in these South African peripheries.
Such financial advantages include relocation costs, subsidizing wages for 
seven years, rent for ten, housing loans and subsidized transport of goods 
to urban areas.See,South African Chinese:The Totally Voteless Com- 
munity.Southscan. Vol. 3 No.8 . 19.10.88.
9. Attention has been drawn to this by M. R. Montsi. Research Priorities 
and Support Needs in BLS. Mimeo. Paper presented at the OSSREA Work­
shop on Social Science Research Priorities and Support Needs. Arusha, 
Tanzania, January 1983.
The author argues that the brain drain from the BLS countries to the Ban­
tustans "is equally crippling to the economies of the BLS countries because 
it is now not a question of the numbers of migrant workers but more a dent 
into the already painfully limited resource of skilled and professional popu­
lation of these countries". See also L.B.B.J. Machobane. Apartheid and the 
Creation o f a New Frontier o f Brain Drain. The Southern African Bantus­
tan. Mimeo. Roma. 1983.
10. Lesotho Weekly. Friday, September 26, 1984.
11. Lesotho Weekly. Friday, November 9, 1984.
12. APS News and Features Bulletin. 1st February. 1988.
13. Ibid. It needs also to be pointed out that one of the problems faced by 
migrants who as it were transit through Lesotho by first working in Leso­
tho for a period and then moving on into the Bantustans is that many have 
difficulties with work and residence permits. This cultivates the psychology 
of temporariness and makes them prone to move on.
It has been suggested that delays in providing work and residence permits 
may be motivated by the wish to discourage a flood of highly skilled mi­
grants into the country who may pose a competitive factor to the employ­
ment of locals.
14. Transkei MPS Call for Clamp on Aliens. Daily Despatch. 6.7.83.
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15. Ibid.
16. Ibid. See also Transkei Warning to Illegal Visitors. D aily Despatch. 
5.4.84.
17. Interview. C.V. Roma. 29.9.87.
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Methodological Issues
In social science research, the methods employed in data collection are di­
rectly advised by the nature and type of data sought. The methods of data 
collection need to be tailor-made for the data required. The specifics of the 
research issues and the conditions of the research environment largely dic­
tate the methods and procedures to be adopted. Thus success in data col­
lection depends to a great extent on the level of refinement of the 
methodological tools for data collection employed in the research exercise.
While the above points are equally true for research endeavours in the natu­
ral sciences, the element of quantitative and qualitative precision, labora­
tory or environmentally controlled conditions, and the relevance of issues 
of space and time, often imply that in natural science research, influential 
variables require precise measurement recognition and control to a degree 
which is not the case in the social sciences. In the social sciences, labora­
tory conditions arc generally inoperative and crucially, the range of influen­
tial but indeterminate variables are often very wide. 1
This study in many ways highlighted some of these concerns. The most 
important factor affecting the process of data collection was the general sen­
sitivity of the study. Because of tlie universal condemnation of South Af­
rica for its institutionalization of racism and the elevation of racism to the 
level of state ideology, most migrants to the South Africa homelands have 
tended to undertake the act of migration with a high degree of secrecy. In 
all cases, their national governments strongly discourage this practice, and 
public opinion in the home countries is not favourable to migration into the 
homelands. As a result of this migrant’s-response to questions relating to 
this study tended to be either overly circumspect, or often unwilling, unco­
operative or stubborn. As a result, the sample of the questionnaire admin­
istered on migrants to elicit their attitudes to the phenomenon of brain drain
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had to be rcduced in size from 200 to a 100. Rather, great reliance was 
placed on informal interviews which were unstructured and open-ended. 
Where migrants were willing to complete questionnaires invariably the an- 
onimity of respondents had to be assured. Questionnaires were treated very 
privately with many respondents asking for assurance that their colleagues 
should under no circumstance be put into the picture.“
Most of the literature and documentary material relevant to the study 
which was collected in South Africa, was done by South African nationals 
of all colours. Again here many asked for assurances with regard to their 
anonimity. Fear of state security control and possible persecution was in 
some cases expressed. These conditions imposed constraints on the quan­
tity and quality of data particularly with reference to the statistical dimen­
sions of the brain drain from independent Africa to the Bantustans.
The difficulty in getting collectors of documentary material was such that, 
the material collected in the Transkei was more and dif ferent from the type 
of material collected in Bophuthatswana, These two Bantustans were the 
only Bantustans from which active data collection took place. Estimates 
indicate however that these two homelands have over 85 percent of all the 
highly skilled migrants from independent Africa working in the South Af­
rican homelands/
South African nationals of the homelands were generally quite forthcom­
ing with information. Most were cooperative and saw the value of the re­
search undertaking as part of the general struggle against apartheid.
Apart from the questionnaires administered in the Bantustans, the do­
cumentary material collected, and the informal interviews conducted on 
both migrants and South African nationals, questionnaires were also admin­
istered in selected source countries namely, Uganda, Ghana, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. All this was done during the two year period span­
ning 1986-88. The questionnaires which were administered in the source 
countries of the highly skilled migrants were very quickly completed. 
There was litUe resistance to this. Indeed most respondents were very forth­
coming. In addition most interviews were conducted in the source coun­
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tries, and documentary material collected. The focus of data collection in 
the source countries was to obtain material which will help clarify attitudes 
in the source countries with regard to the phenomenon of brain drain to the 
Bantustans.
The general thrust of the data collection was not to obtain precise or deli- 
native statistical insights into the strength of opinions or views on brain 
drain to the Bantustans either in the source countries or in the Bantustans. 
The object was to identify the range of views and concerns, estimate their 
relative strengths in order to make a qualitative assessment of their relative 
significance.
In-depth interviews of selected informants have been a very useful method 
employed in this research. The reasons are largely accounted for by the 
sensitivities of migrants to the problems and dangers of exposure to the 
wider world. Respondents and informants proved to be more responsive in 
private. Even then invariably assurances of the discretionary use of the in­
formation were necessary. There have been also problems inherent in this 
method. Figures and hard facts volunteered during in-depth interviews 
have had to be cross-checked, since the method is particularly prone to sub­
jectivism.
Conclusion
While data collection for this study on the whole proved to be a fairly sen­
sitive exercise, with time it was possible to obtain enough material to make 
the study a success. As has been earlier indicated, quantitative precision 
and demographic data was scanty. However the study was able to cull up 
enough material to clarify the essential questions thrown up by the study.
The study and its problems of data collection underscore the general sen­
sitivities of the contemporary problems of South Africa
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NOTES
1. See lor example the Foreword to Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz. Re­
search Methods in the Behavioural Sciences. London, 1953. See also 
Pauline V. Young. Scientific Social Surveys and Research (3rd Edition) 
Inglewood ClilTs. 1956. pp. 103-104. Galtung treats some of these issues 
in an enlightening manner in J. Galtung. Theory and Methods o f Social Re­
search. London, (2nd Impression). 1969. pp 481-490.
2. Problems oI space and costs have not permitted the reproduction in this 
text, the two questionnaires employed in this study i e. the questionnaire ad­
ministered on migrants in the Bantustans and the questionnaire adminis­
tered on respondents in the source countries.
3. The Transkei and Bophuthatswana are politically and economically the 
most "advanced" of the South African homelands. Particularly in the case 
of Bophuthatswana platinum mining at a point in time when world market 
prices for this commodity are favourable has tended to make the Bophu­
thatswana economy currently the most bouyant among the South African 
Bantustans. Bophuthatswana is currently attracting more migrants than 
Transkei.
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Attitudes in the Source Countries and 
Attitudes of Migrants
A.Attitudes in Source Countries
Attitudes in the five source countries in this study differ only slightly. Tlie 
key line of differentiation lies between the old source countries (i.e. Bot­
swana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), and the new source countries. These in­
clude Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe,Cameroon, Togo,Tanzania, 
Mauritius, Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi, but principally and over­
whelmingly Uganda and Ghana. The Ivory Coast, Togo,Tanzania,Came­
roon and Kenya are represented only in isolated cases. These differences 
appear to be differences in emphasis in the views expressed and not sub­
stantial differences with regards to the general import of the views per se.
AGE GROUP PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS (PERCENTAGE) IN
SOURCE COUNTRIES 
Age Group Lesotho Botswana Swaziland U ganda G liana
20-29 27 45 49 28 30
30-39 38 33 34 32 45
4Q;49 21 12 12 20 15
50-59 12 9 4 14 8
60 & Over 2 1 1 6 2
100 100 100 100 100
The gender profile emerged as the following.
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GENDER PROFILE (PERCENTAGE) IN SOURCE COUNTRIES
Sex__________Lesotho Botswana Sway.il and Uganda Ghana
Male 57 49 56 53 55
Female 43 51 44 4 7  4 5
The marital status of the respondents revealed the following.
MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS (PERCENTAGE) IN 
SOURCE COUNTRIES
Marital Status Lesotho Botswana Swaziland Uganda Gh<
Single 32 54 42 51 48
Married 59 30 56 39 38
Separated - 3 0 3 4
Divorced 5 8 1 4 6
Widowed 4 5 1 3 4
The respective country components of the study were represented by 
citizens in each instance. Variously they were drawn from a wide variety 
of occupational backgrounds including civil servants, surveyors, account­
ants, nurses, medical doctors, teachers, lawyers, engineers, secretaries, sol­
diers and police officers, airways personnel, self-employed persons, clerics 
and businessmen.
One criterion of the structural variables of the sample was that respond­
ents should be persons whose horizons and outlook are wide enough to per­
mit them views on highly skilled migrants to the Bantustans. An implied 
condition for the selection of such respondents was that they should be so­
cial elements who have at least education to the secondary level.
In response to the question; "are you aware of the fact that some nationals 
of your country are employed in the South African Homelands?" The fol­
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lowing data emerged.
AWARENESS OF BRAIN TREK TO THE BANTUSTANS
Lesotho Botswana Swaziland Uganda Ghana
Yes 100 92 94 6 6 64
No 6 6 30 35
No Comment 2 - 4 1
It is significant that respondents in Ghana and Uganda were less aware of 
the brain drain to the Bantustans than respondents from the BLS countries. 
In the case of the latter, proximity, history, and social intercourse have 
tended possibly to optimize societal awareness, of the phenomenon. Re­
spondents were also in the BLS countries on the whole less stridently con­
demnatory of the practice. Furthermore it was noteworthy that whereas on 
the average more than 50 percent of the respondents from the BLS coun­
tries indicated that they have relatives working in the Homelands, the aver­
age for Uganda and Ghana was 3 percent.
The responses given to reasons for the out-migration were interesting and 
educative. Most respondents had clear and fairly definite views on this mat­
ter.
REASONS FOR MIGRATION. (REASONS/RESPONDENT) IN 
SOURCE COUNTRIES
Lesotho Botswana Swaziland Uganda Ghana
Higher Salaries/
Benefits/Quality
of life 113 1 0 J 107 122 130
Lack of local jobs 
Political & Social
67 81 73 58 51
Reasons 12 9 13 12 7
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Poor Woik Conditions
locally 5 6 4 6 8
Local corruption,
nepotism e.t.c. 1 2 2 I 2
Other reasons 2 1 1 1 2
Over 55 percent of respondents in all 5 countries felt it was all right to seek 
employment in the Bantustans for the reasons given above. The average 
for Uganda and Ghana on this issue was 48 percent.
It appears that respondents from source countries far removed from South 
Africa tended to be more critical of the brain trek, and were more emphatic 
about the attraction which economic benefits offer.
Political factors as reasons for migration were particularly weak for re­
spondents in Botswana and Ghana.
Respondents were almost equally divided on whether in their estimation, 
there are any perceived differences between highly skilled migrants and ma­
nual workers working in the Bantustans. This question which had special 
relevance to the BLS countries was also extensively answered by respond­
ents from the three countries.
Most respondents in the BLS countries felt that apart from the fact that 
the fundamental difference lies in their salary differentials, another import­
ant point is that "educated people have a choice of going or not going to 
work in the Bantustans, while manual workers have virtually little alterna­
tive and are therefore more or less forced by circumstances to seek employ­
ment in the Homelands".
Most respondents were of the view that their local authorities, have no 
right to stem, or halt such migration.
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SHOULD GOVERNMENT STOP SUCH MIGRATION? (SOURCE
COUNTRIES)
Yes
No
No Comment
Lesotho Botswana Swaziland
46 39 37
54 61 62
Uganda
47
52
Ghana
49
51
Questioned further on the above issue, the predominant response that 
emerged suggested that respondents lelt that lor as long as Uieir home gov­
ernments cannot provide lucrative salaries for work, political and social sta­
bility, and fair and open working conditions it would be wrong for them to 
attempt to stem or halt the drift. Some respondents felt that the How should 
be halted in view of the increasing political turmoil and insecurity in South 
Africa. Others suggested particularly in the BLS countries that the home­
land economies are in competition with their local economies.
"People should not be trained and then leave"; "People should stay at home 
to develop their own countries" were also not uncommon responses from 
those who felt the How should be halted. There were also those who felt 
that their local governments should intervene to stop the How of migrants 
on account of the fact that "there is no freedom because of Apartheid".
Those respondents who have relatives in the homelands, were for the most 
part "happy with the money they got from relations". A smaller proportion 
had mixed feelings in view of the explosiveness of the developing struggle 
for majority rule in South Africa. An equal number expressed the view that 
although they are happy with the remittances they get from close relatives 
working in the Bantustans, they know also too well that "the South African 
Apartheid System oppresses the Blackman". They therefore felt insecure, 
unsafe, and frustrated by the whole issue. While some suggested that they 
missed their relatives others indicated that they felt relieved because at 
home they were frustrated with their job conditions.
52 percent of the whole sample felt that homelands employment supported 
the apartheid system directly or indirectly. The main reasons given can be
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summarized as follows:
( 1) Because the homelands are meant lo divide Africans, exploit African 
labour in order to sustain the South African economy which essentially 
maintains the Apartheid System.
(2) The educated migrants do so wilfully. While the less educated ones 
also support the system they are more forced by circumstances to seek em­
ployment in the homelands.
(3) They give the homelands credibility and respectability and thereby sup­
port the Apartheid System.
(4) They work for institutions and organizations which are the brain child­
ren of the Apartheid concept.
(5) They are legitimizing the system.
Asked how best the flow of trained people to the Bantustans could be 
stemmed, 77 percent of the respondents suggested that better salaries and 
working conditions should be created together with an expansion of local 
job opportunities. 12 percent indicated that the social and political climates 
in their countries need to be democratized and opened up to accommodate 
divergence of views, cultivate political tolerance, accountability and social 
freedom from nepotism and corruption A few felt legislation should be in­
troduced to counter tlie flow while even fewer particularly in the BLS coun­
tries felt that the numbers of expatriates in their countries should be reduced, 
to make room for returning migrants. Some repondents felt that people 
should be better educated about Apartheid while others argued that return­
ing migrants should be ostracized and politically disenfranchised. This 
view was stronger among the younger respondents.
In response to the question, "what should be done to such migrants on their 
return to their countries of origin", the overwhelming majority of respond­
ents felt that they should be provided and attracted with jobs which remun­
erate them appropriately for their qualifications and skills. They should not 
be harrassed except for those with criminal records. While a few respond­
ents felt they should be politically educated and discouraged from going
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back, an equally small number of respondents suggested that they should 
be taxed on their earnings in the Bantustans. There were also some 7 per­
cent of the respondents who were of the view that returnees should be pun­
ished. However about a third of the sample felt they should be reabsorbed 
as quickly as possible into local employment.
Respondents from the BLS countries were more tolerant of Bantustan em­
ployment than respondents in Uganda and Ghana. Closer to the realities ol 
Southern African economy and society, and with histories of migratory la­
bour into South Africa, they tend to be more accommodating while remain­
ing largely aware of the evils of the Apartheid System. The dependence 
syndrome Is more acutely present in respondents in the BLS countries. 
There are those who obviously regard the South African border as "a legal­
istic inconvenience dividing kith and kin".
Respondents in Ghana and Uganda who are much further removed from 
the South African scenario were generally more critical. However even 
then many respondents expressed feelings to the effect that it is the inepti­
tude of their governments, the economic shambles that their societies have 
become, the political insecurity, and the poor quality of life and rewards, 
which are pushing highly trained citizens into the homelands.
b.  Attitudes o f Migrants
The sample of migrants in the Bantustans was mainly composed of Gha­
naians and Ugandans. A few Mauritians, Zimbabweans, Basotho, Swazis, 
and Batswana were included. Their age range and distribution was as fol­
lows:
AGE RANGE DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS
Age Range 
20-29 years 
29-39 years
Percentage
31
34
62
39-49 years 
49-59 years 
60 and over
15
13
7
Eighty two percent of the sample consisted of males. This figure indicates 
cleady that the composition of highly trained migrants to the South African 
homelands is made up largely of males. 69 percent of those who are mar­
ried have left their spouses behind in their home countries. The percentage 
is even higher among secondary school teachers. Doctors, lawyers, den­
tists, and other elements of the highest levels of migrants have often their 
children and wives with them. The data on the marital status of migrants 
was as follows:
MARITAL STATUS OF MIGRANTS
Status Percentage
Single 24
Married 60
Separated 5
Divorced 8
Widowed 3
The overwhelming majority of the migrants have educational qualifica­
tions of graduates or post-graduates.
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF MIGRANTS
Level Achieved Percentage
B. A. or equivalent 69
M.A. or equivalent 9
Ph.D. 3
Other (mainly Diploma) 19
Most migrants received their qualifications from their home countries. The
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majority of those with post-graduate qualifications received their creden­
tials from Europe and North America. Among the teachers only 62 percent 
are teaching in the precise areas of their qualifications. While 67 percent 
of the migrants indicated that they have children only 17 percent of the mar­
ried migrants indicated that they have some or all of their children with 
them. The reasons given for leaving children behind in their home coun­
tries were broadly as follows:
(a) Expensive to keep children with you in the homelands.
(b) The children are "better-off1 being educated in the home country.
(c) One must save as much as possible in the homelands, and rather send 
the money home.
(d) The wife is at home, so its better to keep the children at home.
(e) The children may feel out of place.
Most migrants were sponsored by their home governments during their 
university studies.
UNIVERSITY STUDY SPONSORSHIP OF MIGRANTS
Sponsor Percentage Migrants
Your Government 78
International Organization 11
Self-Sponsored 6
Other 5
The overwhelming majority of Ghanaians, mainly secondary school tea­
chers, had previously worked in Nigeria during the years of the oil-boom. 
Many of both the Ghanaians and Ugandans have also worked in the BLS 
countries prior to their advent into the homelands. Indeed, for these latter, 
it was from the BLS countries that they made enquiries into possibilities of 
employment in the homelands. Most respondents indicated that they were 
not promoted in their previous places of employment. Only 24 percent sug­
gested that the criteria for promotion in their last places of work were con­
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ducive lo good work performance.
The general finding of (he sludy was that migrants would have left their 
previous jobs even if they had had knowledge of oncoming promotion, in 
view of (he superiorly attractive homelands salaries. Only 17 percent of (he 
migrants indicated that their previous employment had offered them some 
training. Of those migrants who indicated that they had received training 
in their previous employment, 72 percent agreed that their training was rele­
vant to the needs of the organization or institution in which they worked. 
91 percent of the migrants indicated that they were attracted to the home- 
la iK ls on account of the higher salaries offered.
Regarding the homelands system and Apartheid, the general attitude of 
migrants was to voice or plead an apolitical position. All agreed that Apar­
theid is an obnoxious system, but only 4 percent agreed that their presence 
and work in the homelands may be strengthening and endorsing the Apar­
theid System. 27 percent of the sample disagreed with the suggestion that 
their presence in the homelands could be read as an unpatriotic or unsym­
pathetic attitude.
The migrant respondents provided a catalogue of ways by which inde­
pendent African states can retain (heir trained manpower. The main ones 
can be summarized as follows:
(1) Provide competitive and better salaries. (This was by far the strongest 
and most persistent recommendation.)
(2) Provide better conditions of service and working conditions.
(3) Avoid nepotism, corruption, and occupational favouritism.
(4) Institutionalize democratic and open political and social processes in 
the conduct of government and public affairs.
(5) Create tolerant social climates.
(6 ) People should be properly and duly rewarded for their work and socie­
tal contribution.
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Asked how long migrants intended to stay in the Bantustans, the follow­
ing picture emerged.
PROJECTED 1 .F.NCtTH OF STAY IN THE HOMELANDS
Period
1-2  years
2-4 years 
4-6 years
6  years or more
Percentage
26
38
21
15
Regarding their appreciation of the intellectual climate in the Bantustans 
the following strength of views were expressed.
INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE IN THE HOMELANDS
Appreciation Percentage of Migrants
Very Good 2
Good 3
Fair 32
Poor 39
Very Poor 24
Most migrants expressed the view that the treatment they receive from 
their hosts is civil, but there are misunderstandings and problems. Some 
complained that they are over-worked. Others mentioned rivalries in vari­
ous areas of social and intellectual life. Generally they were satisfied Only 
12 percent suggested however that they could consider settling in the Home­
lands.
The most difficult feature of their lives in the homelands was indicated to 
be a feeling of "otherness", not completely belonging and homesickness.
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Many complained of missing their families. The most pleasant feature of 
their lives was being generally able to make ends meet in a way they did 
not experience in their previous places of work.
Some conceded that they were aware of the fact that there are colleagues 
amongst them whose claimed academic and training creden- tials may be 
false. This refers to migrants from different parts of the world.
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Responsible Factors and Concluding 
Remarks
The brain drain phenomenon is throughout the world, a worrying issue for 
those countries which lose their brains. Over the past two decades the United 
Kingdom authorities have for example often expressed worry and concern 
about the loss of highly skilled manpower to North America. It is therefore 
not surprising that in the specific case under study, the Ghanaian and Ugan­
dan authorities have on many occasions raised voices of concern for the loss 
of highly skilled citizens to the South African Homelands.
The case under study has however a seriously complicating factor. This 
is that, in this case the recipient country for the highly skilled migrants is a 
country condemned by the whole international community on account of 
its racist policies of government and in its general conduct of societal af­
fairs along strictly racist lines. The worst sufferers and victims of South Af­
rica’s racial policies are the Africans who form the overwhelming 
proportion of the population. African politics since the onset of the era of 
independence in the 1960s has viewed the Apartheid system as its biggest 
challenge. Ghanaians working in the homelands could be reminded of 
Nkrumah’s first independence day speech in March 1957 when he declared 
that;
...the independence of Ghana is meaningless, unless it is 
linked with the total liberation of Africa. . . .1
The South African homelands represent the epitome of the Apartheid con­
cept, and are not recognized by any single country in the entire international 
community.lt is for the above reasons an embarrassment for rhetorically na­
tionalistic and so-called "politically progressive" African states to see their
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nationals streaming into the South African Bantustans as highly skilled mi­
grants whose service in the Bantustans constitute an important factor streng­
thening the existance of the Bantustans,and sustaining the Apartheid 
system.
In a statement made by President Museveni of Uganda and chairman of 
the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African states in 1988. 
He announced that;
U gaud an intellectuals and other citizens of the PTA member- 
states working in the racist republic of South Africa will be 
blacklisted and their names will be circulated to all PTA 
member-states so that they can be arrested whenever they are 
sighted there.3
The question has been raised as to whether President Museveni, "was 
merely talking politics". What has been asked in response to Museveni’s 
statement is that;
..... it is hard to imagine, for instance, that PTA countries can
imprison Ugandan professionals for working in South Afri­
ca when some 700,000 of their own citizens work as migrants 
there.3
It is however noteworthy that for most countries in the Southern African 
region while employment in South Africa is a historical phenomenon, it is 
not generally condoned. It is accepted as "a necessary evil" and in Lesotho 
as one report indicates, trained Basotho migrants who work in the home­
lands are regarded as "sell-outs" by the uneducated. The writer however 
asks;
how can you call somebody who wants survival and in whose 
"free" and "developing" country no jobs are available, a "sell­
out".4
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A similar point was force fully made by a Ghanaian teacher based in rural 
Bophuthatswana.
...the struggle for economic survival brought us here.5
A Makerere university professor candidly reaffirmed this arguement.
Yes, the person may be behaving selfishly. But these people 
are going for only purposes of survival. "Myself and my lam-
What has also been suggested recently is that Uganda is receiving one mil­
lion U.S. dollars per month from its citizens working in South Africa, 
mainly in the homelands.7 Ghanaian migrants also remit large sums to 
Ghana in money and goods.
Without any doubt economic factors and competitive rewards constitute 
the main cluster of reasons why highly skilled migrants from independent 
Africa move into the Bantustans of South Africa for employment. This is 
possibly even more so in the case of Ghanaians and Ugandans than those 
migrants whose countries of origins lie within the Southern African region. 
For the latter although here again economic factors are the preponderant 
ftrce pulling them into the Bantustans, in some cases political reasons play 
some part in motivating the trek. This point was eloquently made in one of 
the past issues of Leselinyana La Lesotho during the period of the Jonathan 
regime.
Leabua has failed to provide Basotho with jobs. It is clear that 
Basotho and their children will continue to look for work out­
side Lesotho in a big way. Matanzima, Mangope, Mopeli, 
and others will continue to employ Basotho in their Bantus­
tans. ...How can one contribute to the development when he 
is demanded to produce a party identity? ...during BNP’s rule, 
many more Basotho workforce will leave for South Africa.
To label people who run away from the harassment of party
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identity "sell-outs", is to fool those who are ignorant.
For migrants from the region, in particular the BLS countries, family ties 
and consanguinal relations bind and move them in and out of South Africa.
Social unrest and instability in home countries are also responsible factors 
for the trek into the homelands. As a senior professor from Makerere 
University said to the present author,
From 1971 to 1978, under Amin the economy was destroyed, 
there was excessive brutality and social chaos. Then there 
was also rampant and unbridled exploitation of the society.
This led to political and economic anarchy. Many Ugandans 
were forced to flee. Many were highly qualified and were em­
braced by a wide variety of African and European countries.
But as the situation became worse in many parts of the world, 
the international institutions became full, neighbouring coun­
tries were also full. Many Ugandans came onto waiting lists 
for years. This sort of thing creates desperation, worsened by 
the fact that there was more enforced law and order however 
anti-African in philosophy in the Bantustans than in Uganda.
If a person has to choose between starving and going to work 
in a racialist society, their options are narrow, if there are any,
9
and they become vulnerable.
In Ghana years of military rule, brutality, and wholesale violations of 
human rights have gone on with a steadily collapsing economy. From the 
early 1960s, the Ghanaian economy has been in ever increasing decline. 
But it was particularly under the various military regimes to date that ex­
cessive repression, social and political intolerance matched by declining job 
opportunities and material rewards, nepotism and corruption, created a cli­
mate which made many highly qualified people prone to migration. Des­
pite the criticism of migrants by the current Rawlings regime, under 
conditions of an extremely austere IMF-sponsored economy, repression, in­
tolerance and corruption continues,witli a penchant for executions. Such a
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social climate can hardly attract back highly trained citizens whose marke­
tability is international. 10
For the near future the South African job market may continue to attract 
highly skilled migrants. In a study produced by the Renwick International, 
its director David Hutton-Wilson, pointed out that, mismanagement of the 
black educational system over the past 30 years, i.e. since the beginning of 
"Bantu Education" has entrenched the 3rd World population and bred a 
generation of unschooled and unskilled people.
The report points out that the fact that 6.5 million black children are being 
educated by teachers of whom only 30 percent have matriculation certifi­
cates, and less than 2 percent have graduated is telling. Hutton-Wilson ob­
serves that;
This country will continue to require imported skills for at 
least the next decade..... 11
Under the combined force of these circumstances it is very likely that high­
ly skilled migrants from independent Africa will continue flowing into the 
Bantustans.Migrants from other African countries may follow the emerg­
ing pattern if economic and social conditions do not improve in their re­
spective countries.
The Apartheid system remains an evil and obnoxious system directed es­
pecially against the African majority. This is a point which is well under­
stood by most Africans, in and out of South Africa.
There is legitimate bitterness by exiled South Africans against other Afri­
cans helping to maintain that system by giving their highly skilled services 
to the system. However economic factors constitute the dominant factors 
governing the human condition, and for as long as attractive rewards arc 
available in South Africa, Africans from beyond the borders will drift into 
the Bantustans for employment. The only realistic way of stemming the tide 
for the moment, is for independent African states to create the economic, 
political, and social climates necessary to attract back their citizens.
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While this study has selectively focussed on migrants from independent 
Africa, it is important to remember that equally large numbers have come 
in over the same period from mainly Europe and the Indian sub-conti- 
nent.However, in sum highly skilled migrants in the South African Bantus­
tans, are from all comers of the world.
NOTES
1. Kwame Nkrumah. Speech at Old Polo Ground. 6 th March, 1957.
2. See Special Correspondent in Kampala report. Why Ugandans Work 
in South Africa. Colin Legum’s, Third W orld Reports. 13 July, 1988.
3. Ibid.
4. See Lesotho Evangelical Church Newspaper. Leselinyana La Lesotho, 
29th July. 1983.
5. Interview. K. A. T. 17.1.88.
6 . Interview. B. K. K. G. Makerere University. 13.7.87.
7. See, Why Ugandans Work in South Africa. Colin Legum’s, Third 
W orld Reports. Op cit. In Uganda a graduate teacher earns about 5 U.S. 
dollars per month while the most highly paid civil servants get 10 U.S. dol­
lars equivalent per month. In the South African Homelands a graduate 
teacher receives about 600 U.S. dollars equivalent per month. In Ghana a 
top notch lecturer receives the equivalent of 60 U.S. dollars per month, 
whereas in the South African Homelands they receive almost 1000 dollars 
per month. The top notch professor in the National University of Lesotho, 
receives about the same salary as the top notch lecturer in the South Afri­
can Homelands. With 12 percent increase in some Bantustans as from De­
cember 1988, the gap is growing even wider.
8 . They Run Away From Party Identities. Leselinyana La Lesotho. 29. 
July. 1983.
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9. Interview. Prof. P. S. D. A. Makerere University. "The points made 
about the Amin period are equally true about the Obote II period (1980-85). 
But worse in the sense that under Obote II the countryside was wildly 
ravaged" Ibid.
10. Recent economic difficulties in Zimbabwe may stimulate a trek of 
highly skilled migrants into South Africa. See "Brain Drain Hits Harare". 
The Star. September. 22.1988.This article shows that there is movement 
into the private sector further economic pressure on the trained civil bure­
aucracy, the health and educational sectors of manpower is likely to increase 
the attractiveness of the South African Bantustans. Growing economic dif­
ficulties in African countries are likely to bring in new migrants from coun­
tries in Africa which have hitherto not featured in the phenomenon.
11. See Robyn Chalmers. Immigration, No. 1, Brain Drain Factor. Sun­
day Times, Business Times, 28 August 1988. See also M. Chester. Brain 
Drain Reaches Crisis Point. The Johannesburg Star. 1st August, 1988.
The interesting point to note here is that while South African white high­
ly skilled migrants leave, Africans from independent Africa are coming in. 
Ghanaian migrants in the Transkei are called "AmaGhana". This term has 
become a general term used to describe loosely all highly trained "foreign 
natives" working in the Transkei. Lately in both the Transkei and Bophu­
thatswana as competition for highly paid jobs increase considerable resent­
ment is building up gradually against highly trained "foreign natives".
The general ideological framework within which this resentment is ration­
alized is "localism and localization". The arguement often takes the form 
of a discourse for the indigenization of government and general social or­
ganization along so-called "national" fines. In reality, it is the result of com­
petition between the local petty bourgeoisie and migrant petty bourgeoisie 
represented by the highly trained elements.
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